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Abstract
We study testable implications for the dynamics of consumption and income of models in which ￿rst
best allocations are not achieved because of a moral hazard problem with hidden saving. We show that
in this environment agents typically achieve more insurance than that obtained under self insurance
with a single asset. Consumption allocations exhibit ￿ excess smoothness￿ , as found and de￿ned by
Campbell and Deaton (1989). We argue that excess smoothness, in this context, is equivalent to a
violation of the intertemporal budget constraint considered in a Bewley economy (with a single asset).
We also show parametrizations of our model in which we can obtain a closed form solution for the
e¢ cient insurance contract and where the excess smoothness parameter has a structural interpretation
in terms of the severity of the moral hazard problem. We present tests of excess smoothness, applied
to UK micro data, and constructed using techniques proposed by Hansen et al. (1991) to test the
intertemporal budget constraint. Our theoretical model leads to interpret them as tests of the market
structure faced by economic agents. We also construct a test based on the dynamics of the cross
sectional variances of consumption and income that is, in a precise sense, complementary to that
based on Hansen et al (1991) and that allows to estimate the same structural parameter. The results
we report are consistent with the implications of the model and internally coherent.
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In this paper, we study the relationship between consumption and income variability in a class of private
information models with asset accumulation and derive some of their empirical implications. In particular,
we characterize the amount of risk sharing occurring in equilibrium when full risk sharing is prevented
by moral hazard and show how to use the joint dynamics of consumption and earnings to measure it.
Moreover, we use our theoretical results to give a structural interpretation to some well known tests in
the empirical consumption literature.
An important contribution of the paper is to provide evidence on the insurance market structure facing
economic agents. Interest in models of imperfect risk sharing is partly motivated by the empirical rejection
of simpler approaches. The complete insurance hypothesis is soundly rejected by the data (e.g. Attanasio
and Davis, 1996). A commonly used alternative is to assume that markets are exogenously incomplete.
For example, the Bewley model embeds a version of the permanent income model in a market structure
where the only mechanism available to agents to smooth consumption is through personal savings (and
borrowing), possibly with a single asset. Intertemporal trades can be further limited by the impossibility
of borrowing beyond a certain level, possibly zero.1 And yet, some important implications of this model
are rejected by the data. Using aggregate data, for instance, Campbell and Deaton (1989) ￿nd that
consumption is ￿ too smooth￿ , in that it does not react su¢ ciently to innovation to permanent income
theory. Campbell and Deaton (1989) label their ￿nding ￿ excess smoothness￿ . Consistently with this
￿nding, a more recent paper by Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) ￿nds that only a fraction of
Permanent Income shocks are re￿ ected in consumption.
In between the two extremes of complete markets and very limited insurance opportunities there
are other possibilities, where individuals have access to some state contingent mechanisms that provide
insurance over and above the ￿ self insurance￿considered in the Bewley model. These intermediate cases
include models where the intertemporal markets available to agents are exogenously given and models
where the market structure arises endogenously from speci￿c imperfections, such as the lack of contracts
enforceability or private information. The model we propose belongs to this latter set. In particular, we
focus on settings with private information problems.
We show how a model where risk is shared imperfectly because of moral hazard can generate ￿ excess
smoothness￿in the sense of Campbell and Deaton (1989). In the single asset version of the self-insurance
model consumption moves one to one with permanent income. Hence, it should fully react to unexpected
shocks to permanent income.2 In terms of Campbell and Deaton (1989), consumption should not display
1Whether these constraints are ever binding depends on the properties of the income process and, in particular, on its
support.
2When the agent has quadratic utility this result holds exactly for the consumption and income in levels. If agent￿ s utility
is isoelastic the same implication can be derived for consumption and income in logs, using standard approximations (e.g.,
Deaton, 1992)
1excess smoothness. In our model, instead, consumers obtain some additional insurance relative to what
they get by self insuring with saving: consumption moves only partially in response to innovations to
permanent income, therefore exhibiting excess smoothness. More importantly, in what follows, we will
be able to map the ￿ excess smoothness￿parameter into the parameter that in a version of our model
measures the severity of the moral hazard problem: the private marginal return to shirking.
We start by developing a theoretical framework with asymmetric information which can be seen as a
dynamic version of Mirrlees (1971). In addition, we assume that agents have secret (or non contractible)
access to credit markets. Our model nests the framework studied by Allen (1985) and Cole and Kocher-
lakota (2001) (ACK), who show that in a pure adverse selection model with hidden asset accumulation
the optimal allocation of consumption coincides with the one the agents would get by insuring themselves
through borrowing and lending at a given interest rate. Our framework however, allows for the possibility
of a much richer set of allocations. In particular, and consistently with the ￿nding of Abraham and Pavoni
(2004) (AP), in our model, the e¢ cient allocation of consumption typically di⁄ers from that arising from
self insurance.
While in what follows we give some general results, we also present two speci￿cations of the model
(one with CARA or quadratic preferences, another with CRRA utility) that allow the derivation of
closed form solution for consumption. These are useful because the magnitude of the excess smoothness
of consumption can be directly related to the degree of control the agent has on public outcomes i.e., to
the severity of the moral hazard problem (as measured by a single parameter). Relatedly, we also discuss
how the model can be used to provide a structural interpretation of recent empirical evidence of Blundell
et al. (2004).
The versions of the model that deliver closed form solutions are able to induce, for di⁄erent parameter
con￿gurations, intertemporal allocations that are identical to those generated by very di⁄erent economic
environments. For certain parameter values, the consumption allocations of our model are identical to
those in a self-insurance model with a single asset, while for other parameter values, they resemble those
that obtain under complete markets.
In our model, because of incentive compatibility on saving decisions, the time series of individual
consumption satis￿es the usual intertemporal Euler equation. This implies that, conditional on the
past marginal utility of consumption, the current marginal utility of consumption should not react to
predictable changes in variables known to the consumer and therefore to predictable changes in income.3
The same is true, however, in the self-insurance and in the full insurance models. What di⁄erentiate the
di⁄erent models is the intertemporal budget constraints that, implicitly, characterize the intertemporal
trades to which the agents have access in the di⁄erent environments.
3The fact that individual consumption satis￿es an Euler equation is a key distinguishing feature of models with hidden
assets respect to models of asymmetric information where the social planner has information on assets and, e⁄ectively,
controls intertemporal trades (Rogerson, 1985; and Ligon, 1998).
2In the self-insurance situation that arises in the ACK environment, agents cannot insure more than
in a standard PIH model with a single asset, while in our model they can. This additional insurance,
while still maintaining the Euler equation, can only be achieved by violating the intertemporal budget
constraint with a single asset. Another way of saying the same thing, is that the allocations in our model
in these cases are equivalent to those that would occur if the agents had access to a certain set of state
contingent trades, rather than only to a single asset with a ￿xed interest rate.
As our approach stresses that the main distinction between the di⁄erent models we consider is in
the intertemporal budget constraint, in the empirical section, we ￿rst use a test of Net Present Value
relations proposed by Hansen, Roberds and Sargent (1991) (HRS from now on). The type of test HRS
derive is related to the ￿ excess smoothness￿test proposed by West (1988), Deaton and Campbell (1989)
and Gali￿(1991). ￿ Excess smoothness￿of consumption is a direct implication of our model and one that
we test directly.
Evidence about the ￿ excessive smoothness￿of consumption based on aggregate data already exists.
However, our exercise is innovative in several di⁄erent ways. First, we provide an interpretation of
excess smoothness that links it to a particular market structure. Previous papers, such as Campbell
and Deaton (1989) or Gali (1991), interpreted it as a generic failure of the PIH. Moreover, since they
take the intertemporal budget constraint implied by the risk free bond as a given (that is they do not
question the market structure of the Bewley model), link the presence of excess smoothness to ￿ excess
sensitivity￿and, therefore, to a violation of the orthogonality conditions implied by some Euler equation.
In our model, Euler equations hold (so that there is no excess sensitivity) and we use a version of the
excess smoothness test that writes it explicitly as a test of the intertemporal budget constraint with a
single asset. As di⁄erent intertemporal budget constraints are linked to di⁄erent market structures, our
empirical evidence provides a test of market structure.
Second, we can give a structural interpretation to the ￿ excess smoothness￿parameter. In particular,
we can relate it to the severity of the moral hazard problem as measured by a single parameter, either in
the function that generates income or, equivalently, in consumer preferences.
Third, perhaps surprisingly, our paper is the ￿rst that presents an excess smoothness test based
on micro data. Altonji et al. (2002), Nalewaik (2006) and Attanasio and Borella (2007) do estimate
time series models for consumption from micro data, but they do not provide an explicit test of excess
smoothness and they do not relate their evidence to a structural model of market structure.
An important feature of our test is that it shares with the HRS and West tests the fact that it is robust
to some mis-speci￿cations of the agents￿information sets. In particular, we only need to assume that the
information set the agents have and use is not smaller than that of the econometrician. In other terms,
we can allow agents to have an informational advantage over the econometrician. As we will explain
more in detail in the main body of the paper, the Euler equation (whose validity is a unique feature of
3the economy we study among those characterized by asymmetric information previously proposed in the
empirical literature) play a essential role in the identi￿cation of some of the information set available to the
agent. Following HRS we are then able to test the validity of the intertemporal budget constraint along
this dimension. Therefore, the evidence we present constitutes one of the ￿rst tests of market structure
that is robust hypotheses of information. In this sense it is relevant for the discussion in Heckman et al.
(2006).
In addition to the HRS test, we also pursue an alternative approach based on the dynamics of cross
sectional variances of consumption and income. This approach is somewhat related to that in Deaton and
Paxson (1994), Attanasio and Jappelli (2001), Attanasio and Szekely (2004) and Blundell, Pistaferri and
Preston (2008). However, our test is derived directly from the equation from consumption levels rather
than consumption changes. Moreover, as in the case of the evidence based on the HRS test, we can give
a structural interpretation to the estimated coe¢ cients of our regression, relating it to the importance of
the moral hazard problem.
Our tests are based on the identi￿cation of certain time series properties of the cross sectional moments
(means and variances) of (the marginal utility of) consumption. For this reason, we need long time series.
In the absence of su¢ ciently long longitudinal data on consumption, we have to use synthetic panels
derived from long time series of cross section. The consideration of synthetic, rather than actual panels,
imposes some limits to the ability of the test based on means to identify risk sharing of idiosyncratic
shocks. As our second test is based on the variances within the groups that de￿ne the synthetic panels,
it constitute an important complement to the ￿rst. In such a situation the two approaches we propose
are strongly complementary as one focuses on insurance across groups while the other focuses on within
group risk sharing.
To perform the empirical test we propose we use synthetic cohort data constructed from the UK
Family Expenditure Survey (FES). With this pseudo panel of cohort aggregated data on consumption
and income we estimate the parameters of a time series model for individual income and consumption
processes that can be used to perform the test proposed by HRS. We also estimate the relationship
between the dynamics of consumption and income cross sectional variances. Using both approaches we
￿nd evidence that is consistent with the model we describe in what follows. Moreover, the results we
obtain from the various tests and using di⁄erent de￿nitions of income, are internally consistent, in that
they vary in a fashion that is consistent with the implications of our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the building blocks of our model,
provide the equilibrium de￿nition and discuss two alternative market structures that will be contrasted to
our economy: complete markets, and the Bewley economy. In section 3, we characterize the equilibrium
allocation for our model and present some examples that yield useful closed form solutions. In Section 4,
we discuss the empirical implications of the equilibria we considered in Section 3, present our tests, and
4the results we obtain. Section 5 concludes. The appendices contain the proofs of the results stated in the
text.
2 Model
2.1 Tastes and technology
Consider an economy consisting of a large number of agents that are ex-ante identical, and who each live
T ￿ 1 periods. Each agent is endowed with a private stochastic production technology which takes the
following form (neglecting individual indexes for notational ease):
yt = f(￿t;et): (1)
That is, the individual income yt 2 Y ￿ < can be a⁄ected by the agent￿ s e⁄ort level et 2 E ￿ < and the
shock ￿t 2 ￿ ￿ <. The history of income up to period t will be denoted by yt = (y1;:::;yt); while the
history of shocks is ￿t := (￿1;:::;￿t): Let ￿
￿
￿t+1 j ￿t￿
be the conditional probability of ￿t+1 conditioned on
￿t 2 ￿t. The component ￿t can be interpreted as the the agent￿ s skill level at date t. At this stage, we do
not impose any speci￿c structure on the time series properties of ￿t, but we assume that ￿t are iid across
individuals. In each period, the e⁄ort et is taken after having observed ￿t: The function f : ￿ ￿ E ! Y
is assumed to be continuous and increasing in both arguments. Both the e⁄ort e and the shocks ￿ will
be considered private information, giving rise to moral hazard problems, while yt is publicly observable.





with ct 2 C and ￿ 2 (0;1): We assume u to be real valued, continuous, strictly concave, and smooth.
Moreover, we require u to be strictly increasing in c and decreasing in e. Notice that, given a plan for
e⁄ort levels there is a deterministic and one-to-one mapping between histories of the private shocks ￿t
and yt; as a consequence we are entitled to use ￿t alone. Denote by ￿t the probability measure on ￿t and
assume that the law of large numbers applies so that ￿t (A) is also the fraction of agents with histories
￿t 2 A at time t.
Since ￿t are unobservable, we make use of the revelation principle and de￿ne a reporting strategy
￿ = f￿tg
T
t=1 as a sequence of ￿t-measurable functions such that ￿t : ￿t ! ￿ and ￿t(￿t) = ^ ￿t for some
^ ￿t 2 ￿: A truthful reporting strategy ￿￿ is such that ￿￿
t(￿t) = ￿t a.s. for all ￿t: Let ￿ be the set of
all possible reporting strategies. A reporting strategy essentially generates publicly observable histories





￿1 (￿1); :::; ￿t
￿
￿t￿￿
; with ht = ￿t when ￿ = ￿￿:
5An allocation (￿;c;y) consists in a triplet fet;ct;ytg
T
t=1 of ￿t-measurable functions for e⁄ort, con-
sumption and income growths (production) such that they are ￿ technically￿attainable
￿ =
￿





The idea behind this notation is that incentive compatibility will guarantee that the agent announces
truthfully his endowments (i.e. uses ￿￿) so that, in equilibrium, private histories are public information.
For simplicity we disregard aggregate shocks, and we do not allow for productive assets such as capital.
In the baseline model, we assume the availability of a constant return technology that allows q 2 (0;1)
units of consumption at time t to be transformed into one unit of consumption at time t + 1; or vice
versa. Equivalently, we are assuming a small open economy or a village economy where a money lender
has access to an external market with an exogenously given interest rate r: The number q = 1
1+r can be
interpreted as the time constant price of a one period bond in the credit market. In this case, absent






















Although we present our results with the assumption of a small open economy with a constant interest
rate, in the Appendixes we show that the same results can be derived with a time varying interest rate
and even for the case of a closed economy.4
2.2 Equilibrium and Market Arrangements
Having described agents￿tastes and the technological environment they face, to characterize intertemporal
allocations we need to specify the market arrangements in which they operate and de￿ne the relevant
equilibrium concepts.
Our economy is characterized by private information, as we assume that e⁄ort and skill level are
not observable. In addition to the moral hazard problem, consumption is also not observable (and/or
contractable) and agents have hidden access to an anonymous credit market where they trade risk-free
bonds at price q. The agents do not have private access to any other anonymous asset market.5
The market structure we adopt is an open economy version of that proposed in Golosov and Tsyvinski
(2007). In addition to the anonymous (secondary) market for assets, there is a (primary) insurance market
where a continuum of identical ￿rms o⁄er exclusive contracts to agents. All insurance ￿rms are owned
equally by all agents. At the beginning of period one, each ￿rm signs a contract (￿;c;y) with a continuum
4For a similar model in a small open economy see Abraham and Pavoni, 2004, 2005, and 2008. For a simple analysis in
a closed economy with capital see Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2007.
5The assumption that in the anonymous asset market only the risk free asset is traded is done without loss of generality
in our environment as no other Arrow security would be traded (e.g., see Appendix A in Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007))
6of agents in the economy that is binding for both parties. Firms operate in a competitive market and
agents sign a contract with the ￿rm that promises the highest ex-ante expected discounted utility. After
the contract is signed, each agent chooses a reporting strategy ￿; supplies e⁄ort levels so to generate, at








units of consumption. Firms can
borrow and lend at the ongoing interest rate, which they take as given.


























where g(y;￿) represents the e⁄ort level needed to generate y when shock is ￿; i.e., g is the inverse of f
with respect to e keeping ￿xed ￿: Since y is observable, the mis-reporting agent must adjust his/her e⁄ort
level so that the lie is not detected.
Let b := fbt+1g
T
t=1 be a plan of risk free asset holding, where bt is a ￿t￿1￿measurable function with















qt￿1 (ct ￿ yt) j (￿;c;y); ￿￿
#
￿ 0; (4)












t ; ^ e￿
t ) j (￿;c;y); ￿
#
for all ￿ 2 ￿; (5)
where the deviation for consumption ^ c￿ must be such that the new path of consumption can be replicated
by the use of a risk free bond. More precisely, given (￿;c;y;b); for each ￿ a deviation ^ c￿ is admissible if
































De￿nition 1 Given q; an equilibrium for the economy is an allocation (￿￿;c￿;y￿) and bond trades b￿
such that
i) Firms choose (￿￿;c￿;y￿;b￿) solving problem (3)-(5) (taking q as given);
ii) Agents choose their reporting strategy, e⁄ort levels, consumption, and asset trades optimally as de-
scribed above, given the contract (and q);
iii) The intertemporal aggregate feasibility constraint (2) holds.
7It is straightforward to see that the incentive constraint (5) (considered at ￿￿) implies that the

















where the marginal utilities are evaluated at the equilibrium values dictated by (￿￿;c￿;y￿):6
2.3 Two Useful Extreme Cases
With an eye to our empirical strategy, it is useful to compare the allocations in our imperfect information
model with those that would prevail in two well known alternative and extreme cases. We ￿rst consider a
full information setting; we then move to a situation where intertemporal trades are exogenously restricted
to the risk free bond. Both situations can be obtained, under certain parameter settings, as a special
case of our model. Moreover, both can be characterized by a di⁄erent intertemporal budget constraint.
Full information. In the model where there is no private information problem, in equilibrium, the
typical ￿rm o⁄ers exclusive contracts solving problem (3)-(4) alone. That is, the ￿rm will solve the
same problem as before with the crucial exception of condition (5). Since in this case we are in a
complete market setting, we can apply the well known Welfare Theorems which imply that the equilibrium
allocation solves the problem of a planner aiming to maximize the representative agent￿ s utility subject
to the feasibility constraint, condition (2).
Note that, as in our set up, with full information the equilibrium allocation satis￿es the Euler equation




c (ct+1;et+1); and hence also in expected terms.
Permanent Income (Self Insurance). We denote as permanent income or self-insurance the alloca-
tion derived from autarchy by allowing the agents to participate to a simple credit market with a constant
one period bond price q. They do not have access to any asset other than a risk free bond. Recall that
the plan of asset holding b is constituted by a set of ￿t￿1￿measurable function bt; t = 1;:::;T with b1 = 0.











ct(￿t) + qbt+1(￿t) ￿ bt(￿t￿1) + yt(￿t); (8)
6This condition is the ￿rst order equivalent to the incentive constraint that ensures that the agent is not willing to deviate
in assets decisions alone, while contemplating to tell the truth about shock histories ￿
t.
8where b0 = 0: As usual we rule out Ponzi games by requiring that limt!T qt￿1bt(￿t) ￿ 0: Condition (8)
is the budget constraint typically used in Permanent Income models when the agent has only access to a
risk free bond market. For future reference, notice that this problem can be seen as an extension of the
permanent-income model studied by Bewley (1977) which allows for endogenous labor supply and non
stationary income.











where Et [￿] is the conditional expectation operator on future histories given ￿t:
Another important necessary condition that individual intertemporal allocations have to satisfy in
this model can be derived by repeatedly applying the budget constraint (8). Starting from any node
￿ ￿
t￿1; t ￿ 1; with asset holding level bt(￿ ￿




qn￿t (cn(￿n) ￿ yn(￿n)) ￿ bt(￿ ￿
t￿1); (10)
almost surely (a.s.) for all histories ￿T emanating from node ￿ ￿
t￿1.
Given the income process and the price for the bond q; conditions (9) and (10) de￿ne consumption
(even when a closed form solution does not exist). It is interesting to compare the intertemporal budget
constraint (10) for t = 1 with the corresponding equation for the full information case, equation (2).
In the latter case, the agent has available a wide array of state contingent securities that are linked in
an individual budget constraint that sums over time and across histories, as all trades can be made at
time 1. In the Bewley economy, instead, the agent can only trade in a single asset. This restriction on
trade requires that the net present value on consumption minus income equals zero a.s. for all histories
￿T: Notice that there is no expectation operator involved in condition (10): the intertemporal transfer
technology implied by a risk free asset does not allow for cross-subsidizations of consumption across
income histories.
The lesson we should retain from this section is that all allocations considered here satisfy the Euler
equation: clearly such an equation is consistent with many stochastic processes for consumption. The
key feature that distinguishes the three di⁄erent equilibrium allocations we have considered is the inter-
temporal budget constraint, which de￿nes the relevant market structure. For instance, the equilibrium
allocation in our moral hazard model typically violates the (NPVC) (10) which is relevant for the per-
manent income model. That is, the intertemporal budget constraint based on a single asset is violated
because it ignores the state contingent payments the agents might receive from the insurance ￿rm in our
economy.
93 Characterizing the equilibrium allocation
In this section, we analyze the properties of the endogenously incomplete markets model we presented
above. It is easy to see that the equilibrium allocation (￿￿;c￿;y￿) and b￿ can be replicated by an incentive
















ct(￿t) = yt(￿t) + ￿t(￿t); (12)








It is clear, from condition (12), that we study equilibrium allocations where agents do not trade inter-
temporally (b￿
t ￿ 0): This is done without loss of generality since the ￿rms and the agents face the same
interest rate.7 Alternatively, ￿ could be chosen so that the transfer ￿t = ￿t(￿t) represents the net trade on
state contingent assets the agent implements at each date t node ￿t. In this case, the lump sum transfer
would solve E[￿t] = 0 and all the intertemporal transfer of resources will in e⁄ect be made by the agents.
In Appendix A, we show that, under some conditions, the equilibrium allocation (￿￿;c￿;y￿) - and
b￿
t ￿ 0 - can be ￿ implemented￿using a transfer scheme ￿￿ which is function of income histories yt alone.8
This will simplify the analysis and allow us to describe the consumption allocation in terms of observables.
At history yt; an agent with asset level bt will face the following budget constraint for all yt :
ct + qbt+1 = yt + ￿￿
t(yt) + bt:
3.1 Bewley model and excess smoothess
In this section, we ￿rst present a speci￿c economy where we get the ￿ Allen-Cole-Kocherlakota￿(ACK)
result. As stressed in AP, the crucial restrictions to obtain the ￿ self-insurance￿result are on the way e⁄ort
is converted into output. We then move on to relax these restrictions. Within the more general case, we
consider a speci￿c parametrization of the income process that allows us to obtain a closed form solution
for the equilibrium transfers. While this example is useful because it gives very sharp predictions, some of
the properties of the allocations we discuss generalize to the more general case and inform our empirical
speci￿cation.
7E.g., see Fudenberg et al., 1990.
8In particular, we assume that the optimal plan of consumption c is y
t-measurable.
10Self Insurance. Let consider the following speci￿cation of the model. Assume agents￿preferences and
production satisfy:
u(c;e) = u(c ￿ e) and f (￿;e) = ￿ + e; (14)
with ￿ = (￿min;￿max) and E = (emin;emax). Obviously, in this environment the optimal plan of e⁄ort
levels is indeterminate. As long as 0 2 E, we can hence set, without any loss of generality, e￿
t ￿
0. This normalization has two advantages. First, since et does not change with ￿t while f(￿t;et) is
strictly increasing in ￿t; all variations in ￿t will induce variations in yt, automatically guaranteeing the
yt￿measurability of c (see Appendix). Second, an added bonus of the constant e⁄ort is that we can
focus on the risk sharing dimension of the equilibrium allocation. This last argument also motivates the
modeling choice for our closed form solution below.
Proposition 1 Assume T < 1 and that the utility function u and the production function f as as in
(14). Then the equilibrium allocation coincides with self insurance.
The proof of the proposition is reported in Appendix A, where we show that incentive compatibility
fully characterizes the equilibrium allocation. The main intuition of the result can be easily seen in a
two period model, which we solve backwards. Consider the last period of the program. Using the budget























for all ^ eT 2 E:
Clearly, in order to be incentive compatible, the transfer scheme must be constant across yT￿ s. Now
consider the problem in period T ￿ 1: For ease of exposition, let us assume that the transfer scheme is














































9The formal proof does not assume di⁄erentiability. See Appendix A.
10Note that in the expression below
@￿￿
T(yT)
@yT￿1 has been taken out from the expectation operator as we saw that ￿ T is
constant in yT shocks.
11Equation (15) states that the net present value of transfers must be constant across income histories.
The intuition for the fact that the ￿rm is unable to provide any consumption insurance on top of self-
insurance is relatively simple in this case. First, at each t with equilibrium income y￿
t = ￿t; the agent can
always deviate, locally, and generate any income level such that y￿
t ￿￿ ￿ ^ yt ￿ y￿
t +￿: Second, the perfect
substitutability between consumption and e⁄ort in the utility function on one side and between income
and e⁄ort in production on the other side imply that such deviation has zero direct cost to the agent. Since
this is true for all income levels, in a static setting, these two observations together imply that the ￿rm
will never be able to provide a transfer scheme that induces anything di⁄erent than constant payments
over income levels. In our model, this simple intuition extends to a general dynamic setting. Roughly
speaking, the free access to the credit market implies that the agent only cares about the present value of
transfers (i.e., he/she does not care about the exact timing of deterministic transfer payments). A simple
extension of the previous argument hence implies that the present value of transfers must be constant
across income histories as otherwise the agent would ￿nd pro￿table to perform some local deviation on
e⁄ort and engage in an appropriate bond plan.
Now recall that self insurance has two de￿ning properties: ￿rst, it must satisfy the Euler equation.
Second, it must satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint with one bond, i.e., the period zero net
present value must be zero for all yT. Since the Euler equation is always satis￿ed here, the only way of
obtaining a di⁄erent allocation is that the transfers scheme ￿￿ permits to violate the agent￿ s period zero
self insurance intertemporal budget constraint for some history yT. The previous argument demonstrates
that it cannot be the case, hence the only incentive compatible allocation coincides with self-insurance.
This implies that the ￿ relaxed-optimal￿contract obtained by using the local (￿rst-order-condition) version
of the incentive constraint corresponds to the self insurance allocation. Since this allocation is obviously
globally incentive compatible, it must be the optimal one.
The proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix, never uses the time series properties of ￿t; which can
therefore be very general. Likewise, we do not require a constant q:11 Proposition 1 is therefore, in some
dimensions, a general result. Indeed, as we shall see in Section 3.4, it holds even in a more general model
that allows for two types of income shocks, with di⁄erent degrees of persistence.
Proposition 1 and its proof, however, also make it clear that the coincidence between the equilibrium
allocation and self-insurance is, in other dimensions, very fragile. Below, we present a full class of models
with slightly more general u and f functions, where the equilibrium allocation coincides with self-insurance
only for a zero measure set of parameters.12
11Both Allen (1985) and Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) assume iid shocks and constant q. We generalize Allen￿ s result,
while our model does not nest, strictly speaking, Cole and Kocherlakota￿ s as we do not impose exogenous and binding
liquidity constraints.
12AP also obtain similar results. They consider a more general class of models but do not derive su¢ cient conditions for
the self insurance result and do not obtain closed form solutions.
12Excess Smoothness. Consider now the following generalization of agent￿ s preferences:
u(c;e) = u(c ￿ v (e));
with v increasing and convex. Since consumption and e⁄ort cost enters the utility function in a linear
fashion, we eliminate the wealth e⁄ects. This simpli￿es the analysis and allows for closed form solutions.
Moreover, it is crucial for the self-insurance result we derived above. While we only consider interior
solutions for e, we leave the function f unspeci￿ed.
Again, the main intuition regarding the model can be gained by studying the last two periods. Let￿ s

















Recall that in the ACK model we have v0 (e) = f0
e (e;￿) = 1 for all e;￿: Since risk sharing requires
@￿￿
T(yT￿1;yT)




lower than one. In fact, it is easy to see that - under some regularity conditions on f and v - for all ￿T;
the optimal contract implements e⁄ort levels such that
v0(eT)
f0
e(eT;￿T) ￿ 1 (as long as this is technologically
feasible).13 A strict inequality is compatible with some risk sharing.
What is the intuition for this fact? If the ￿rm￿ s aim is to make agents share risk, the key margin
for an optimal contract is to guarantee that the agent does not shirk or, equivalently, that she does not
reduce e⁄ort. When the agent shirks so that output is reduced by one unit, the gain she gets from this
reduction in e⁄ort is equivalent to v0
f0
e units of consumption. This is the right hand side of (16). The left
hand side is the net consumption loss. When the marginal tax/transfer is negative this loss will be less
than one as the direct reduction of one unit of consumption is mitigated by the increase in net transfers.
A small v0
f0
e reduces shirking returns making easier for the ￿rm to satisfy the incentive compatibility, hence
to provide insurance. The same intuition carries over to a multi-period setting, where the generalized






















13Assume there is at least one ￿ e 2 E such that
v0(￿ e)
f0
e(￿ e;￿) ￿ 1: Implementing an e⁄ort level where
v0(eT )
f0
e(eT ;￿T ) > 1 is dominated







e ] ￿ 0 (i.e., the Spence-Mirrlees condition holds for the static version of our problem) the ￿rm can provide
the same ex-post welfare to the agent by saving net transfer costs as it also improves on insurance. Details on the formal
derivation are available upon request.
133.2 Closed Forms
Now, consider the following speci￿cation for f: Assume income yt depends on exogenous shocks ￿t and
e⁄ort et as follows:
yt = f (￿t;et) = ￿t + aminfet;0g + bmaxfet;0g; (17)
with a ￿ 1 ￿ b: In Figure 1 we represent graphically the production function f in this case. Notice that
when a = b = 1; one obtains the linear speci￿cation used to obtain the self-insurance result. Preferences
are as in the previous section14
u(ct;et) = u(ct ￿ et):
Moreover, we assume that ￿t follows an ARIMA(p) process:
￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 = ￿ (L)vt; (18)
where ￿ (L) is a polynomials of order p in the lag operator L; invertible, and the innovation vt is iid. Since
e⁄ort will be time constant, in equilibrium, ￿t = yt hence the income process will display the standard
representation often used in the consumption literature.15
In Proposition 3, stated and proved in Appendix B, we show that if u is exponential (CARA):
u(c ￿ e) = ￿1
￿ expf￿￿(c ￿ e)g; and the shocks vt are normally distributed with zero mean and variance
￿2






















where ￿c indicates the variance of consumption growth. For t ￿ T ￿ p, the previous expression reduces













Hence, for a = 1 we are back to the self-insurance case; for a > 1; we get some more risk sharing over
and above self-insurance, with full insurance obtainable as a limit case for a ! 1. Proposition 5 in the
appendix we show that a very similar (simpler) closed form can be obtained assuming quadratic u; ￿ = q;
and di⁄erentiability of the transfer scheme.16 With CARA utility (as opposed to the model where u is
quadratic), the presence of a precautionary saving motive implies that the equilibrium allocation displays
increasing consumption. Notice, however, that, in our economy, a > 1 permits both to reduce the cross






15See, for example, Abowd and Card (1989), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
16In this case, no parametric assumptions are needed for the income process and consumption does not grow because a
precautionary saving motive is absent. See Appendix B for details.
14sectional dispersion of consumption and to mitigate the precautionary saving motive, hence the steepness
of consumption (i.e., ￿ intertemporal dispersion￿ ). The model implies a very tight relationship between
these two moments.
In this example, our ability to derive a closed form solution is driven by two factors: the assumption
of CARA (or quadratic) utility - which, as is well known, allows one to derive closed form solution in a
standard life cycle model - and the type of concavity assumed on the function f, which takes the form of
a piece-wise linear function. Such a simple function makes zero e⁄ort the optimal level the ￿rm is trying
to implement, so that one can clearly separate the incentive and the risk sharing margins. The amount
of risk sharing the ￿rm can give the agent is that amount that does not induce the agent to shirk. If the
￿rm tries to provide a bit more risk sharing, there will always be some agent willing to lie and shirk.
3.3 The Case with Isoelastic Utility
We now discuss the case in which agents have isoelastic preferences. Full details are to be found in the
Appendix. We assume the following production function:
yt = ￿tet:
This model corresponds to a simple dynamic variant of the most standard version of the well know model
by Mirrlees (1971), where y is labor income, ￿ represents worker￿ s productivity, and e hours of work. We

















; for et ￿ 1; for ￿ > 1;
u(ct;et) = lnct ￿
1
a
lnet; for et ￿ 1; and u(ct;et) = lnct ￿
1
b
lnet; for et ￿ 1; for ￿ = 1;
where a ￿ 1 ￿ b: As before, therefore, we are assuming that the marginal cost of e⁄ort changes discon-
tinuously above a threshold level, here et = 1: Moreover, we assume that
ln￿t ￿ ln￿t￿1 = ￿ (L)lnvt;
where (with a small abuse in notation) we posit that lnvt is normally distributed with zero mean and
variance ￿2
v. In this context, we can obtain a closed form for discounted net transfers that leads - for






















17Again, we could have assumed, equivalently, u(ct;et) = (ct￿e￿1
t )
1￿￿




t for et ￿ 1 and yt = ￿te
b
t for et ￿ 1; with a ￿ 1 ￿ b:
15where ￿ ￿ 0 is a nonnegative constant such that q￿ ￿ ￿ for ￿ ￿ 1; and ￿ = 1 whenever u is logarithmic
(￿ = 1) and ￿ = q (see Appendix B for details). For a = 1 and pure permanent shocks, one obtains the
same expression as in the self insurance model (with zero wealth). In all cases, for a = 1; we obtain again
an expression very similar to those derived - sometimes through approximations - in the self insurance
literature (e.g., Deaton, 1992, and Banks et al., 2001, and Blundell et al., 2008).
￿ Pure￿Moral Hazard. Finally, we can use equation (20) to draw attention to an important dif-
ference between our model and one with observable assets. It is well known that in that case, when
preferences are additive separable, the inverse of the marginal utility follows a martingale and, therefore,
the Euler equation is violated (see Rogerson, 1985; and Ligon, 1998). In that framework, it is easy to










The key di⁄erence between this expression and (20) is that, according to (21), consumption growth
decreases with an increase in the variance of consumption and therefore, income shocks. This prediction
is inconsistent with the evidence in, for instance, Banks et al., 2001.
3.4 An Extended Model with Two Types of Shocks
We now brie￿ y present an extension of our model that allows for two types of (independent) shocks
to income, with di⁄erent degrees of persistence. Although we develop the model in levels, very similar
expressions can be derived for the log-linear case.
Assume agents have preferences over ct; lt and et as follows: ￿1
￿ expf￿￿(ct ￿ et ￿ lt)g: Moreover,
assume that individual income can be decomposed into two components: yt = xt+￿t; where xt = f (￿
p
t;et),














t iid; while ￿t represents the temporary one, as vT
t is iid. The production function f is as in (17),







t + aT minflt;0g + bT maxflt;0g with aT > 1 > bT:
Since e⁄ort will be again time constant, in equilibrium, the income process will display the following
process:19




18With CARA utility the same expression holds true for consumption in levels.
19We could easily allow the temporary shock v
T
t to follow a MA(p) process.
16We can now follow a line of proof very similar to that used for the baseline model (see the Appendix),
and show that, as T ! 1, the reaction of consumption to the di⁄erent shocks can be written as20
￿c￿





























The closed form for the version of our model with two types of shocks provides a structural inter-
pretation of recent empirical evidence. Using the evolution of the cross sectional variance and covariance
of consumption and income, Blundell et al. (2008) estimate two parameters, ￿ and  ; representing the
fraction of permanent and temporary shocks re￿ ected into consumption. Within our model estimates
of these parameters can be interpreted as the severity of informational problems for income shocks of
di⁄erent persistence.
Before moving to the empirical speci￿cations, we make two remarks about the income processes that
yield closed form solutions. First, in all our examples, the time-constant optimal level of e⁄ort (0 or 1)
can be interpreted as a normalization. Second, at the optimal level of e⁄ort, the income process is fully
consistent to the standard income process used in the permanent income literature.
4 Empirical Implications of the Model
The model we developed in the previous section has some important empirical implications. In our
model, while the Euler equation holds, we have a violation of the intertemporal budget constraint with
a single asset. This violation gives rise to what in the literature has been called ￿ excess smoothness￿of
consumption, that is consumption does not react ￿ enough￿to innovations in permanent income. As we
saw in the previous Section, we can give a structural interpretation to the excess smoothness coe¢ cient
as re￿ ecting the severity of moral hazard.
In this section, we implement this idea by developing two di⁄erent and complementary tests of the
implications of our model on micro data. The ￿rst is an ￿ excess smoothness￿test derived from a time
series model of consumption and income and is based on the test of Intertemporal Budget Constraints
(IBC) proposed by Hansen, Roberds and Sargent (1991) (HRS henceforth). As mentioned above, testing
20The correspon￿ng expression for the model in logs is
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intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ￿ = 1 whenever ￿ = 1 and q = ￿.
17the validity of an IBC is equivalent, in our context, to testing a market structure. The second test is
based on the dynamics of consumption and income inequality within groups, as measured by variances
of log consumption. While the second test allows us to estimate the same structural parameter, it has a
di⁄erent focus. As we discuss below, the two tests complement each other.
As we study the extent to which income shocks are insured or are re￿ ected into consumption, we need
to use individual level data. Unfortunately, however, longitudinal survey that follow individuals over time
and contain complete information on consumption are extremely rare. One of the most commonly used
panels from the US, the PSID, for instance, only contains information on food consumption. Other data
sets, which contain complete information on consumption, such as the Consumer of Expenditure Survey
(CEX) in the US or the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) in the UK have a very short longitudinal
dimension (like the CEX) or lack it completely (like the FES). As a long time period is crucial to identify
the time series properties of the variables of interest, this lack of longitudinal data is a problem for us.
As we explain below, to overcome this di¢ culty we use synthetic cohort data or pseudo-panels, along the
lines proposed by Deaton (1985) and Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985).
Our main data source is the UK Family Expenditure Survey from 1974 to 2002. The FES is a time
series of repeated cross sections which is collected for the main purpose of computing the weights for the
Consumer Price Index. Each survey consists of about 7,000 contacted over two-week periods throughout
the year. As households are interviewed every week throughout the year, the FES data are used to
construct quarterly time series. This allows us to exploit a relatively long time series horizon. We use
data on households headed by individuals born in the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s to form pseudo
panels for 4 year of birth cohorts. As we truncate the samples so to have individuals aged between 25
and 60, the four cohorts form an unbalanced sample. The 1930s cohort is observed over later periods of
its life cycle and exits before the end of our sample, while the opposite is true for the 1960s cohort. A
part from the year of birth, the other selection criteria we used for this study is marital status. As we
want to study relatively homogeneous groups, we excluded from our sample unmarried individuals. We
also excluded the self-employed.
This data set, which has been used in many studies of consumption (see, for instance, Attanasio
and Weber, 1993), contains detailed information on consumption, income and various demographic and
economic variables. We report results obtained two di⁄erent de￿nitions of consumption. The ￿rst uses as
￿ consumption￿expenditure on non durable items and services, in real terms and divided by the number
of adult equivalents in the households (where for the latter we use the McClemens de￿nition of adult
equivalents). The second also includes the expenditure on durables.
Within our model, the budget constraint of the standard PIH is violated because it considers dispos-
able income from labor and a single asset and ignores state contingent transfers. The latter that can be
interpreted as the returns to other assets that provide the additional insurance or could be interpreted
18as an additional source of income. This implies that if one were to modify the de￿nition of income to
include these state contingent transfers one would go back to a version of the PIH and to its implica-
tions. One, therefore, should not be able to detect ￿ excess smoothness￿with this changed de￿nition of
income. This suggests changing the de￿nition of income in our empirical exercise: if one considers income
de￿nitions that include transfers that are conceived to insure individual shocks, one should observe less
￿ excess smoothness￿when applying our tests. For this reason, in what follows we apply our tests using
￿rst gross earnings as our de￿nition of income, then using gross earning plus public transfers and ￿nally
net earnings and transfers.
4.1 The HRS approach
In constructing our ￿rst test we follow HRS. They consider an income process yt which is one element of the
information structure available to the consumer and assume that it admits the following representation:
(1 ￿ L)yt := ￿yt = ￿(L)wt; (24)
where wt is a n￿dimensional vector of orthogonal covariance stationary random variables that represent
the information available to the consumer. ￿(L) is a 1 ￿ n vector of polynomials in the lag operator
L. Here we adopt only in part the HRS notation and adapt it to ours. In particular, without loss of
generality, we start from a representation for the income process that has already been rotated so that
its ￿rst component represents the innovation for the process that generates consumption.22 It is useful
to decompose the right hand side of equation (24) into its ￿rst component and the remaining ones:
￿yt = ￿1(L)w1t + ￿2(L)w2t: (25)
The ￿rst result that HRS prove in their paper is that an intertemporal budget constraint has empirical
content, in that it imposes testable restrictions on the time series behavior of income and consumption,
only if one has restrictions on the time series property of consumption, for example that it follows a
martingale. When this is not true, one can always ￿nd a time series representation for consumption
and disposable income that satis￿es an IBC. In our model an Euler equation is always satis￿ed because
of the availability of the hidden asset, so that the HRS test has empirical content. Moreover, whether
consumption satis￿es an Euler equation can be checked empirically, which we do.23
22HRS work with a slightly more general framework where the income process is made stationary by the transformation
￿(L); which we are assuming to be equal to (1 ￿ L):
23A short digression is in order here. Evidence of the ￿ excess sensitivity￿ of consumption to income, as reported by
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and others is usually interpreted as a violation of the orthogonality conditions implied by the
Euler equation for consumption. Such evidence would constitute a problem for the use of the HRS test we are proposing.
However, there is evidence that many of the violations reported in the literature are based on aggregate time series data
and are explained by aggregation problems and/or the failure to control for the evolution of needs over the life cycle. See
19The martingale restriction on the process for consumption implies that consumption can be repres-
ented by:
￿ct = ￿w1t (26)
where ￿ is a scalar di⁄erent from zero whenever markets are not complete. Notice that equation (26)
does not include lags. The coe¢ cient ￿ represents the extent to which income news are re￿ ected into
consumption. HRS show that, given this structure, the net present value condition implies some restric-
tions on the coe¢ cients of equations (26) and (25). In particular, the intertemporal budget constraint
implies that:
￿ = ￿1(q) (27)
￿2(q) = 0 (28)
HRS show that restriction (27) is testable, while restriction (28) is not, in that there exist other rep-
resentations for income, that are observationally equivalent to (25) for which the restriction holds by
construction. The alternative hypothesis that ￿ < ￿1(q) is equivalent to what Campbell and Deaton
(1989) and West (1988) de￿ne as ￿ excess smoothness￿of consumption.
The theoretical structure we have illustrated in the previous section provides a structural interpret-
ation of the ￿ excess smoothness￿and HRS tests. Notice the similarity of equations (18) and (19) to
equations (25) and (26).24 The null considered by HRS corresponds to the Bewley model we considered
in Section 2.3, which also corresponds to a special case of our model (see Section 3.1). The moral hazard
model we constructed generates a speci￿c deviation from the null: it implies ￿1(q)=￿ = a: The extent
of ￿ excess smoothness￿has, in our context, a structural interpretation. It represents the severity of the
incentive problem.
An important feature of the HRS approach is that the test of the NPV restriction does not require
the econometrician to identify all information available to the consumer. Intuitively, the test uses two
facts. First, under the null, the intertemporal budget constraint with a single assets must hold whatever
is the information set available to the agent. Second, under the assumption that the agent has no
coarser information than the econometrician, the validity of the Euler equation implies that consumption
innovations reveal part of the information available to the agent. By following the HRS strategy, we test
the intertemporal budget constraint along the dimensions of information identi￿ed via the Euler equation
(which is not zero as long as insurance markets are not complete).
Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995). Attanasio (2000) presents a critical discussions of these issues. Another reason that can
explain income and consumption tracking each other can be the non separability of consumption and leisure in the utility
function, a point made early on by Heckman (1974) and on which Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995) and Blundell, Browning
and Meghir (1994) provide some evidence.
24Simply set ￿ =
1
a; w1t = vt; ￿1 (L) = ￿ (L); and ￿2 (L) = 0:
20The representation in equations (26) and (25) is derived under the assumption that preferences are
time separable. A more general formulation of equation (26) is the following:
￿ct = ￿ (L)w1t; (29)
where c in equation (29) represents total consumption expenditure, which enters the budget constraint,
while utility is de￿ned over the consumption services which, in turn are a function of current and,
possibly, past expenditure. The polynomial in the lag operator  (L) re￿ ects these non-separabilities or
other complications, such as i.i.d. taste shocks to the instantaneous utility function (see Attanasio, 2000
and the discussion in HRS, Section 4). The non-separabilities considered in HRS imply that  (q) = 1;
which imposes restrictions on the way lagged shocks enter the equation for consumption growth. The
restriction on the coe¢ cients of  (L) implies that, in this case, the NPV restriction takes the same form
as in equation (27). We will need this extension to interpret some of our results.
We follow HRS and consider a time series representation of consumption and income as a function of
two (unobservable) factors. As in HRS, this gives rise to an MA representation of the following form:
￿cht = ￿cc(L)vh1t (30)
￿yht = ￿yc(L)vh1t + ￿yy(L)vh2t;
where we have added the subscript h to denote households and stress that the application will be on micro
data and assume that the two vectors v are independent of each other and over time (we allow, however,
correlation between vhit and vkit;i = 1;2;h 6= k; to take into account aggregate shocks). The system
(30), which is identi￿ed by a standard triangular assumption that consumption is only a⁄ected by the
￿rst factor, can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood, making some assumptions about the distribution
of the relevant variables. As in HRS, it is straightforward to show that, in the case of the intertemporal
non-separability implied by equation (29) the intertemporal budget constraint with a single asset can still
be tested as an hypothesis on the coe¢ cient of the system (30), provided that the process for consumption
satis￿es some restrictions that we discuss below. In particular, if the IBC holds (and therefore there is
no excess smoothness), the relevant restrictions to be tested are ￿cc(q) = ￿yc(q); while excess smoothness
will imply ￿cc(q) ￿ ￿yc(q): And once again, ￿cc(q)=￿yc(q) = 1=a; re￿ ecting the severity of the moral
hazard problem in our model.
The presence of intertemporal non-separabilities implies an equation like (29) for consumption changes,
and, in particular, the presence of lagged values of w1: Consumption is not a martingale anymore. How-
ever, as we mention above, the relevant Euler equation still provides enough restrictions that make the
IBC is testable. Moreover, some of these restrictions are testable in a system like (30), as they translate in
restrictions on the ￿ coe¢ cients. While the hypothesis that  (q) = 1 cannot be tested because the coe¢ -
cients of   are not identi￿ed (￿cc(q) is proportional to  (q)), we can identify coe¢ cients on lagged values
21of v2 in the ￿rst equation of the system (30) and test the hypothesis that they are zero. The alternative
that they are di⁄erent from zero corresponds to the standard excess sensitivity tests, which have been
applied many times in the literature, since Hall (1978). Intuitively, a coe¢ cient on lagged values of v2
in the consumption equation would imply that consumption is excessively sensitive to expected changes
in income to be consistent with the PIH. We implement these tests on our data below. In our context
these tests are important because, as stressed by HRS, if consumption does not satisfy the restrictions
implied by the Euler equation, we cannot meaningfully test the intertemporal budget constraint.
To implement the estimation of system (30) on our data, some important modi￿cations of the standard
procedure used by HRS are necessary. In particular, we need to take into account that we are using
household level data and that we do not have longitudinal data. To address these two problems, we use
the approach recently developed by Attanasio and Borella (2006).
Because our data do not have a longitudinal dimension, we do not observe the quantities on the left-
hand-side of equations (30). As mentioned above, we overcome this problem by using synthetic cohort
techniques (see Deaton, 1985). In particular, given groups of ￿xed membership, indexed by g, and an
individual variable zh
gt, we can state, without loss of generality:
zh
gt = zgt + ￿h
gt
where the ￿rst term on the right hand side de￿nes the population group mean. We do not observe zgt; but
we can obtain a consistent estimate e zct of it from our sample. This will di⁄er from the population mean
by an error whose variance can be consistently estimated given the within cell variability and cell size
(see Deaton, 1985). The presence of this measurement error in the levels will induce an additional MA(1)
component in the time series behavior of the changes in the variables of interest. The variability of this
component will have to be taken into account when estimating the parameters of the model. We do so by
assuming that the information on within cell variability provides an exact measurement of the variance
of this component. Given the sample sizes involved, this assumption is not a very strong one. Given the
known values for the variance covariance matrix of the sampling error component, the likelihood function
of the MA system in (30) can be computed using the Kalman ￿lter (for details see Attanasio and Borella
(2006)).
Given these considerations, aggregating the household level equations (30) at the group level and
assuming that the degree of the polynomials in the lag operator is 2, the system that we will be estimating
can be written as:
￿cgt = v1gt + ￿cc




0 v1gt + ￿
yy
1 v1gt￿1 + ￿
yy
2 v1gt￿2 + v2gt + ￿
yc
1 v2gt￿1 + ￿
yc
2 v2gt￿2 (31)
where we normalized the coe¢ cient of the contemporaneous ￿rst factor in the consumption equation
and of the second factor in the income equation to be one. In addition to estimating the coe¢ cients in
22the above system, we also test the hypothesis that coe¢ cients on lagged value of v2gt do not enter the
consumption equation.
4.1.1 Results in levels
In Tables 1 and 2 we report the estimates we obtain estimating the MA system (31) by Maximum
Likelihood. As we allow the variance covariance matrix in the system to be cohort speci￿c, we limit the
estimation to cohorts that are observed over a long time period. This meant to use a balanced pseudo
panels with two cohorts: that born in the 1940s and that born in the 1950s. We experimented with
several speci￿cations that di⁄ered in terms of the number of lags considered in the system. The most
general speci￿cation included up to eight lags in both the consumption and income equation. However,
no coe¢ cient beyond lag 2 was either individually or jointly signi￿cant. In the Table, therefore, we focus
on the speci￿cation with 2 lags.
In the tables we impose the restriction that the coe¢ cients on the lagged value of v2t are zero. We test
this hypothesis and we never reject the null at standard signi￿cance levels. The estimated coe¢ cients are
small in size and never signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, either individually or jointly. This is an important
result as it correspond to a non-violation of the excess sensitivity test. The results are available upon
request.
Table 1 uses as a de￿nition of consumption the expenditure on non-durables and services. We use
three di⁄erent de￿nitions of income. The ￿rst is gross earnings, the second gross earnings plus bene￿ts
(such as unemployment insurance and housing bene￿ts) and the third is net earnings plus bene￿ts. For
each of the three de￿nitions we report two speci￿cations: one with 2 lags in each of the two equations
and one where the insigni￿cant coe¢ cients are restricted to zero.
Several interesting elements come out of the Table. First, the dynamics of income is richer than that of
consumption. However, and perhaps surprisingly, the coe¢ cients on the lags of w2gt are not statistically
signi￿cant and are constrained to zero in columns 2, 4 and 6. In the consumption equation the coe¢ cient
on the ￿rst lag of w1gt is consistently signi￿cant and attracts a negative sign. As discussed above, this
could be a sign of intertemporal non-separability of preference, maybe induced by some elements of non
durable consumption to have some durability at the quarterly frequency.
The test of the intertemporal budget constraint, which is parametrized as ￿ (q)￿￿1(q) clearly shows
the presence of excess smoothness. Interestingly, such evidence is stronger for gross earnings. The value of
the test does not change much when we add to gross earnings bene￿ts (as in columns 3 and 4). However,
when we consider net earnings plus bene￿ts, the value of the test is greatly reduced in absolute value
(moving from -0.49 to -0.26), although still statistically di⁄erent from zero. Therefore, when we use a
de￿nition of income that includes an important smoothing mechanism, we ￿nd much less evidence of
consumption ￿ excess smoothness￿relative to that income de￿nition.
23Table 2 mirrors the content of Table 1, with the di⁄erence that the de￿nition of consumption we use
now includes the expenditure on durables. The results we obtain are, in many ways, similar to those
of Table 1. Perhaps surprisingly, the coe¢ cient on lagged w1gt in the consumption equation is smaller
in absolute value than in Table 1 and for two of the three income de￿nitions, not statistically di⁄erent
from zero. The most interesting piece of evidence, however, is that the coe¢ cient that measures excess
smoothness is now considerably lower, indicating less consumption smoothing relative to the null of the
Bewley model. This is suggestive of the fact that durables might be playing an important role in the
absorption of shocks, as speculated, for instance by Browning and Crossley (2004). However, when we
consider di⁄erent income de￿nitions, the evidence is consistent with that reported in Table 1, in that
relative to net earnings consumption exhibit much less ￿ excess smoothness￿than relative to gross earnings.
4.1.2 Results in logs
When re-estimating the system using the speci￿cation in logs, we try to use the same sample used in the
speci￿cation in levels. However, as we aggregate the non linear relationship (that is we take the group
average of logs), we are forced to drop observations that have zero or negative income. A part from
this, the sample is the same. We report our estimates in Table 4. Given the evidence on the dynamics
of consumption discussed above, we only report the results for total consumption, which includes the
expenditure on durables. Results for non durables and services are available upon request from the
authors. The evidence is consistent with that of Table 2 in levels in that we do ￿nd evidence of excess
smoothness. The drop in the size of the excess smoothness parameter when we move to de￿nitions
of income that include some smoothing mechanisms is even more dramatic than in Table 2. In the
last column, corresponding to net earnings plus bene￿ts, the excess smoothness parameter, while still
negative, is insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
4.2 The evolution of cross sectional variances
The empirical implications of the model we stressed so far focus on the means of consumption and income.
However, it might also be useful to consider the implications of the theory for the cross sectional variances
of income and consumption. For this purpose, it is particularly useful the closed form solution derived in
Appendix B for the Isoelastic case (see equation (54)):
lnci
t = lnyi














+ ￿i + zt; (32)
where we should stress that we do not allow any sort of heterogeneity in the crucial parameter a. The
term ￿i allows for ex-ante heterogeneity, which could capture distributional issues, the initial level of
assets of individual i; or ￿xed e⁄ects which can be observable to the ￿rm but may be unobservable to
24the econometrician. The term zt allows for aggregate shocks, which will be assumed to be orthogonal to
individual shocks and included in the information set of all agents in the economy.




































obtained by assuming constant ￿0s across agents in the same group (like in our theoretical model).







Notice that equation (34) allows again the identi￿cation of the structural parameter a; which re￿ ects
the severity of the moral hazard problem. As noted by Deaton and Paxson (1994), under perfect risk
sharing, the cross sectional variance of consumption is constant over time. Under the PIH, as pointed out
by Blundell and Preston (1998), the changes in the variance of consumption re￿ ect changes in the variance
of (permanent) income. Here, we consider a speci￿c alternative to the perfect insurance hypothesis that
implies that consumption variance grows, but less than the increase in the variance of permanent income.
In the presence of two type of shocks, the tests based on equations (34) remain valid under the
assumption that the variance of transitory shocks does not change over time.25 If that assumption were
to be violated, then one would have to identify the fraction of the variance of income accounted for by
permanent and transitory income using longitudinal data and then relate each of them to the evolution of
consumption inequality. The empirical strategy we follow here is quite di⁄erent from Blundell, Pistaferri
and Preston (2008). They study the evolution of the cross sectional variance of consumption growth,26
while we start from the speci￿cation for consumption levels in equation (32) to derive equations (34).
The estimation of equation (34) also requires the identi￿cation of groups. Here the group implicitly
de￿nes the participants in a risk sharing arrangement and the test will identify the amount of risk sharing
within that group. As with the estimation of the HRS system, the lack of truly longitudinal data and the
use of time series of cross sections, implies that the estimated variances (for income and consumption)
will have an error component induced by the variability of the sample. This is particularly important










































; Cov (lnxt;ln￿t) and V ar(ln￿t) are time invariant (as it is the case in our
model), the analysis we performed in the main text remains valid, with exactly the same interpretations for the coe¢ cients.
Of course, since ￿V ar(ln￿t) = 0 we would have ￿V ar(lnxt) = ￿V ar(lnyt); hence only the a
p(= a) can be identi￿ed.
26This has important advantages, but it forces to use the approximation V ar(￿ct) ￿ ￿V ar(ct).
25for the changes in the variance of income on the right hand side: the problem induced is e⁄ectively a
measurement error problem which induces a bias in the estimated coe¢ cient. However, as explained in
Appendix C, it is easy to obtain an expression for the bias implied by an OLS estimator in ￿nite samples
and correct it.
To estimate the parameters in equation (34) we use the same sample we used for the HRS test, with
the only di⁄erence that we do not limit ourself to the balanced pseudo panel but use four cohorts, although
the youngest and oldest are only used for part of the time period. Otherwise the selection criteria used
to form our sample are the same as above.
The results are reported in Table 4. There are four columns in the Table, each reporting the slope
coe¢ cient of equation (34) and the implied a with the corresponding standard errors. The standard error
of a is computed by the delta method. In the ￿rst two columns, we use expenditure on non durables
and services as our de￿nition of consumption. In the second column, total consumption is divided by the
number of adult equivalents. In the third and fourth column we report the results obtained using total
expenditure as our de￿nition of consumption. Once more, in the second of these two columns the total is
divided by the number of adult equivalents. The three panels correspond to the same three de￿nitions
of income we used for the HRS test.
The ￿rst aspect to be noted is that all the slope coe¢ cients are positive and statistically di⁄erent
from zero. Moreover, consistently with the theory, they all imply a value of a greater than unity. Finally,
the results are a⁄ected only minimally by the consideration of adult equivalents.
If we analyze the di⁄erence across income de￿nitions we ￿nd results that are consistent with the
implications of the model and, by and large, with the evidence from the HRS approach. The coe¢ cient on
the changes in the variance of gross earnings is much smaller than the one on the other income de￿nitions.
This is consistent with the evidence from Tables 1 and 2 which showed more ￿ excess smoothness￿for this
de￿nition. Unlike in Table 1 and 2, however, the main di⁄erence in the size of the coe¢ cient is between
the ￿rst income de￿nition on one side and the second and third from the other. With the HRS approach,
instead, the main di⁄erence was between the ￿rst and second on one side and the third on the other.
Finally, if we look at the di⁄erences between the de￿nitions of consumption that include durables and
those that do not, we ￿nd that the coe¢ cients are (except for the ￿rst income de￿nition) larger for the
former than the latter. Again, this is consistent with the evidence from the HRS approach which ￿nds less
￿ excess smoothness￿when one includes durables in the de￿nition of consumption, i.e., some self-insurance
mechanisms seems to be at work via durables.
The consistency of the results obtained with the variance approach and those obtained with the HRS
approach are remarkable because the two tests, as stressed above, focus on di⁄erent aspects of risk sharing:
the latter on insurance across groups and the former on insurance between group. It is remarkable that
both yield results that are in line with our model and indicate that the observed amount of risk sharing is
26in between that predicted by a simple Permanent Income model and that predicted by perfect insurance
markets. Comparing the magnitude of the coe¢ cients obtained with the two approaches, we can have a
measure of the di⁄erent degree of risk sharing possibilities that are available within cohorts as opposed
to those available across cohorts.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of a model where perfect risk sharing
is not achieved because of information problems. A speci￿c and important feature of our model is that
in addition to the standard moral hazard problem, in the economy we study, agents have hidden access
to the credit market. After characterizing the equilibrium of this model, we have shown how it can be
useful to interpret individual data on consumption and income.
Developing results in Abraham and Pavoni (2004), we have shown that in a competitive equilibrium
of our model agents typically obtain more insurance than in a Bewley set up. Moreover, we are able
to construct examples in which we can get closed form solutions for consumption. These results have
more than an aesthetic value: in our empirical approach they allow us to give a structural interpretation
to some of the empirical results in the literature and to those we obtain. In particular, in our model
one should observe the so-called ￿ excess smoothness￿of consumption. Moreover, ￿ excess smoothness￿is
distinct from the so-called excess sensitivity of income to consumption. Finally, we can map the excess
smoothness parameter into a structural parameter.
The presence of excess smoothness follows from the fact that, even in the presence of moral hazard
and hidden assets, in general, a competitive equilibrium is able to provide some insurance over and above
what individuals achieve on their own by self insurance. This additional insurance is what generates
excess smoothness in consumption, which can then be interpreted as a violation of the intertemporal
budget constraint with a single asset. The equilibrium allocations generated by our model violate the
IBC with a single asset because they neglect some state contingent transfers the agents use to share risk.
One attractive feature of our model is that, depending on the nature of the income process and in
particular the severity of the moral hazard problem we can get as special cases very di⁄erent allocations,
some of which have been extensively studied in the literature. On one extreme, for some con￿gurations
of the relevant parameters, we are able to get the type of allocation that would prevail under complete
markets. On the other extreme, we can get the allocations observed in a Bewley economy. What di⁄er-
entiates these allocation is the nature of the intertemporal budget constraint (which arises endogenously
given the assets available to the agents).
Tests of the intertemporal budget constraint, therefore, become tests of market structure in our
framework. For this reason we start our empirical work using a test of ￿ excess smoothness￿that was ￿rst
proposed as a test of the Intertemporal Budget Constraint with a single asset by Hansen, Roberds and
27Sargent (1991). We extend their approach so that it can be applied to micro data.
Because longitudinal data on consumption are rarely available, we work with time series of cross
sections and synthetic cohort data. As we are forced to aggregate the consumption and income of
individuals belonging to a given year of birth cohort, we necessarily loose some of the variability in
idiosyncratic income and the possibility of studying the amount of risk sharing of these shocks. This
is one of the reasons why, in addition to the extension of the HRS test we propose an additional test,
which uses the movements in the cross sectional variances of consumption and income to identify the
same structural parameters of our model.
While related to the work of Deaton and Paxson (1994), Blundell and Preston (1994) and Blundell,
Pistaferri and Preston (2008), our approach is di⁄erent in that it focuses on the variance in the level
rather than changes of consumption. Moreover, as is the case of the version of the HRS test we present,
we can give the coe¢ cients we estimate a structural interpretation in terms of our moral hazard model.
The approach followed by Blundell et al., (2008) is di⁄erent from ours. It is more general in some
dimensions and less so in others. In particular, they exploit the panel dimension of the PSID and are
able to distinguish the e⁄ects of consumption of permanent versus temporary income shocks. In our data
we cannot identify separately the two parameters. In any case, if one prefers the assumptions made by
Blundell et al. (2008) to those we make in deriving our test based on cross sectional variances, one can
still use our model to give a structural interpretation to the Blundell et al. (2008) results. The fraction
of temporary and permanent shocks re￿ ected into consumption estimated by Blundell et al. (2008) (￿
and  ) can be mapped into the parameters ap and aT in equation (23).
While many papers, starting with Deaton and Campbell (1989) have documented the ￿ excess smooth-
ness￿of consumption using aggregate time series data, the evidence based on micro data is recent and very
limited. Using our two di⁄erent approaches and data from the UK, we forcefully reject both perfect risk
sharing and the simple Bewley economy while we do not reject the hypothesis of ￿ no excess sensitivity￿
of consumption to income. More generally, our results are consistent with our model our rejections are
consistent with the model with moral hazard and hidden assets we considered. Particularly suggestive
is the evidence that when we consider income de￿nitions that include smoothing mechanisms, such as
social assistance and net taxes, we ￿nd less evidence of ￿ excess smoothness￿ .
Our results have obvious policy implications, as one could, in principle, be able to quantify in terms of
welfare the insurance role played by the taxation system or unemployment insurance. Such computations
would be immediately feasible from our analysis. We would also be able to perform accurate counterfac-
tuals in order to evaluate the e⁄ects of a given policy. All normative issues, however, are left for future
research.
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6 Appendix A
6.1 Implementing the e¢ cient allocation with income taxes
In this section we show that under some conditions the equilibrium allocation (￿;c;y) can be ￿ described￿using a
transfer scheme ￿ which is function of income histories yt alone. This will simplify the analysis and allow us to
describe the consumption allocation in terms of observables.
Notice ￿rst, that through yt =yt(￿
t) the y component of the equilibrium allocation generates histories of income













this mapping. In general yt(￿
t) is not invertible, as it
might be the case that for a positive measure of histories of shocks ￿
t we get the same history of incomes yt.
A generalization of the argument used in Kocherlakota (2005) however shows that it su¢ ces to assume that the
optimal plan of consumption c alone is yt-measurable. That is, that there exists a sequence of yt-measurable
functions c￿ such that for all t;￿







t): We now show that under fairly general conditions
the implementation idea of Kocherlakota (2005) extends to the general case with hidden savings.
Now, notice that yt is yt-measurable by construction. As a consequence, from (12) is easy to see that the
yt-measurability of c implies that ￿ is yt-measurable as well. From the transfer scheme ￿, we can hence obtain the






































































t: For any history of shocks ￿
t; a plan ^ ￿ not only entails di⁄erent e⁄ort costs, it also
generates a di⁄erent distribution over income histories yt hence on transfers and consumption. This justi￿es our
notation for the conditional expectation.
We say that the equilibrium allocation (￿;c;y) can be described with yt￿measurable transfers if the agent does















t￿1 u(^ ct; ^ et) j ^ ￿
#
; (35)
32where, as usual, the deviation path of consumption ^ c must be replicated by a plan of risk free bonds ^ b. An
important restriction in the deviations ^ ￿ contemplated in constraint (35) is that they are required to generate
￿ attainable￿histories of y0s; i.e. histories of y0s that can happen in an equilibrium allocation. The idea is that any
o⁄-the-equilibrium value for yt will detect a deviation with certainty. One can hence set the ￿rm￿ s transfers to a
very low value (perhaps minus in￿nity) in these cases, so that the agent will never have incentive to generate such
o⁄-the-equilibrium histories.
Finally, suppose the agent chooses an e⁄ort plan ^ ￿ so that the realized history ^ yt is attainable in equilibrium.
This means both that there is a reporting strategy ^ ￿ so that ^ yt = (y1 (^ ￿); y2 (^ ￿); :::; yt (^ ￿)) and that given a
consumption plan ^ c the utility the agent gets is E
hPT
t=1 ￿
t￿1 u(^ ct;et) j (￿;c;y); ^ ￿
i
; where the notation is that
in the main text.27 This e⁄ectively completes the proof since the incentive constraint (5) guarantees that the agent
will chose the truth-telling strategy which implies the equilibrium plans ￿ and c as optimal for him.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We now show that, for the speci￿cation of preferences and production function we stated in Proposition 1, incentive
compatibility fully characterizes the e¢ cient allocation. In fact, we will allow for a generic sequence of bond prices
fqtg
T￿1
t=1 faced by both the agents and the ￿rms in the economy.
In order to avoid the use of the taxation principle, we will consider transfers schemes that depend on the
revelation plan ￿. This notation would also be more directly related to the Bewley model of Section 2.3. Recall
that T < 1, and consider the last period of the program. Using the budget constraint, assuming the agent declared
history ￿
T￿1 so far, and has wealth bT; after the realization of ￿T, his/her preferences over the report ￿T of ￿T can
be represented as follows:










The key aspect to notice here is that since utility depends on the declaration ￿T only through the transfer, the














is ￿ attainable￿it can be


























































t￿1 u(ct;et) j (￿;c;y); ^ ￿
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) ￿ 0 a.s. for all histories
￿
t. A ￿nal remark. One can easily show that under the same conditions, ￿ must also be xt-measurable. If ￿ is
not xt-measurable it means that for at least two some ￿
t; and ￿ ￿


























for some s ￿ t with ￿ not ys-measurable. A contradiction to the fact that the equilibrium transfer scheme
￿ is yt￿measurable.
33agent will declare the productivity level delivering the maximal transfer whenever possible. More precisely, for any
value of eT(￿



















for all ￿T 2 [￿ ￿ ￿;￿ + ￿]:
This condition applied to all ￿T 2 ￿ implies that a transfer payment ￿T which is invariant across ￿T￿ s is the sole
incentive compatible possibility.
Now consider the problem in period T ￿1: We now show that - given ￿
T￿2 and ￿T￿1 - an incentive compatible










across ￿T￿1 levels. Note that in our notation we used the fact that ￿ is constant across ￿T: Consider a generic history
￿





























0 su¢ ciently close to ￿





T￿1 (and change e⁄ort by the di⁄erence between the two productivity levels) and adjust his/her bond
plan accordingly. We just have to show that there is a bond plan so that the agent is better o⁄by declaring ￿
00
T￿1:But
this is easy to see since ￿T does not depend on ￿T. More precisely, if cT￿1; cT(￿T) is the consumption plan under
￿
0
T￿1 then cT￿1 + ￿
1+qT￿1; cT(￿T) + ￿
1+qT￿1 is one of the consumption paths attainable by deviating, where ￿ > 0
is the di⁄erence between the two net present values of transfers. A similar argument applies to the case where the
inequality is reversed. In this case, the pro￿table deviation would be takes by the agent who receives shock ￿
00
T￿1.











is at most ￿
t￿1-measurable since it is a constant number for all continuation histories ￿t;￿t+1;:::;￿T following
node ￿













￿n is one number a.s. for all histories ￿
T. As we argued already in the main text while discussing
equation (6), another necessary condition for incentive compatibility is the agent￿ s Euler equation. The problem of
the ￿rm facing a relaxed (local) incentive compatibility constraint hence reduces to the choice of the unique number
NPV1 and the plan of bonds holdings for the agent. Since the agent and the ￿rm face the same sequence of bond
prices, it is easy to see that the ￿rm is indi⁄erent across all bond plans. This implies that the only number NPV1
consistent with nonnegative pro￿ts and with maximizing the agent￿ s utility is zero. Moreover, this number can be
obtained by setting ￿t ￿ 0 (equivalently we could assume the transfer ￿ is set so that the agent chooses bt ￿ 0):
It is now obvious that ￿t ￿ 0 globally incentive compatible, implying that it must be the optimal one. We have
hence shown that the optimal allocation corresponds to the bond economy allocation. Q.E.D.


































= 0 a.s. for all ￿
T:
34But these are precisely the two de￿ning properties for the self-insurance allocation: ￿rst, it must satisfy the
Euler equation. Second, it must satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint with the risk free bond, i.e., the period
zero net present value must be zero for all ￿
T. Since the Euler equation (6) is always satis￿ed in our allocation, the
only way of obtaining a di⁄erent allocation is that the transfers scheme ￿ permitted to violate the agent￿ s period
zero self insurance intertemporal budget constraint for some history ￿
T. The whole point of Proposition 1 is to
demonstrate that it cannot be the case.
A ￿nal remark. Although the proof uses ￿nite time, by adapting the proof of Proposition 7 in Cole and
Kocherlakota (2001), we can show the result for T = 1; at least as long as u is a bounded function.
7 Appendix B: Closed Forms
The outcome of this section will be a set of closed form solutions to our model which give a structural interpretation,
in terms of the marginal cost/return of e⁄ort, of the coe¢ cient ￿ coming from a generalized permanent income
equation of the form:
￿ct = ￿t + ￿￿y
p
t;





with a ￿ 1; and where 1
a is the marginal return to shirking. Since in our model wealth e⁄ects are absent (at
least in the chosen space), the equilibrium contract implements a constant e⁄ort level in all periods, which will be
normalized to a given number: the ￿rst best level of e⁄ort. So the whole margin in welfare will come from risk
sharing. The incentive compatibility constraint will hence dictate the degree of such insurance as a function of the
marginal cost of e⁄ort. A lower e⁄ort cost/return allows the ￿rm to insure a lot the agent without inducing him to
shirk. And the ￿rm will use the whole available margin to impose transfers and obtain consumption smoothing.
7.1 Closed Form in Levels: CARA Utility
7.1.1 Model







maxfet;0g; with a ￿ 1 ￿ b; (36)
Interestingly, as we have seen in Section (3.1) for a = b = 1 we are in the standard ACK case, hence there is no
room for risk sharing at all (on top of self insurance) and the allocation replicates that of the Bewley model.
Finally, notice that as long as a > 1 (and b < 1) the ￿rst best e⁄ort level would be zero. However, the ￿rst
best allocation would also imply a constant consumption. This allocation can only be obtained by imposing a
35constant tax rate such that ￿0
t = ￿1: Obviously, this allocation is not incentive feasible in a world where e⁄ort and
productivity are private information of the agent.
The main steps towards the derivation of our closed form will be as follows. First, we consider a relaxed
optimization problem. More precisely, we consider an auxiliary problem for the ￿rm that imposes strictly less
stringent incentive constrains and the same objective function and the same technological constraints. Then we
show that the solution for the relaxed problem corresponds to our closed form. Finally, we show that our closed
form satis￿es the original incentive compatibility constraint. This implies that the closed form solution solves the
original maximization problem of the ￿rm.
7.1.2 The Relaxed Problem


















s.t. for all ￿
t;t ￿ 1 :





































































































































































: Clearly, UT+1 ￿ VT+1 ￿
0:
The maximization problem is relaxed with respect to the original problem solved by the ￿rm in equilibrium in
a number of dimensions. First, the incentive constraints are only for downward deviations. Second, the deviation
is ￿ local￿because it assumes that the agent never lies for more than one period although he is allowed to deviate
for more than one period in the bond decisions after a ￿rst deviation. Finally, also bond deviations are ￿ local￿since
the agent starts with zero wealth at each node in equilibrium.
36Lemma 1. The contract solving problem (R) implements e(￿
t) = 0 for all ￿
t.
Proof. Take any contract and suppose that for some history ￿
t we have e(￿
t) > 0: Then consider the contract
that keeps all transfers and recommendations as the previous one, but at history ￿




t) and zero e⁄ort: ~ e(￿T￿1;￿T) = 0; and transfers ~ ￿(￿
t) = ￿(￿
t) + (1 ￿ 1
b)e(￿
t). It is easy to see
that - at all histories - the new contract delivers exactly the same argument of the utility function u in equilibrium.
We have to show that the incentive constraints are all satis￿ed under the new contract. The fact that the in
equilibrium for all histories the arguments of u are all the same implies that Us (￿
s) are unchanged for all s and ￿
s:







for all s ￿ 0; ￿
t+s and ^ ￿t+s;b do
not change either. Finally, since the modi￿cation of the contract leaves the equilibrium utilities unchanged at all
nodes (including node ￿







for all k ￿ 1 are also una⁄ected by the change:








contemplate deviations over declarations after period t ￿ k - the set of consumption plans available by deviating
only in the bond are unchanged by the modi￿cation to the contract.
Consider now how the change in the contract might a⁄ect the incentive constraint in period t: Clearly it can
a⁄ect the incentives for productivity levels above ￿t; call these values ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t (we include ￿ ￿t = ￿t since the agent
with productivity ￿t might ￿nd pro￿table the bond deviation under then new contract). Since the equilibrium
utilities (both ￿ ows u and values Ut) do not change, in order to verify the new transfer scheme solves period t






















































































The last inequality is true because of the following. If y(￿
t￿1;￿t)￿￿ ￿t > e(￿
t￿1;￿t) > 0 then the change in transfer
scheme generates exactly the same utility to the deviating agent. If y(￿
t￿1;￿t) ￿ ￿ ￿t < e(￿
t￿1;￿t) then the utility
from deviation decreases. We show it assuming that y(￿





t) ￿ ￿ ￿t > 0 is






































t￿1;￿t) < 0: The case against e(￿
t) < 0 follows from a similar line of proof. This implies that the
equilibrium utility of the agent is unchanged. At this point one can try to actually increase agent￿ s utility but we
only need to show that our closed form solution belongs to the set of optimal contracts. Q.E.D.











s.t. for all ￿
t;t ￿ 1 :
max b;^ ￿t￿￿t u
￿
^ ￿t + ￿(￿
t￿1;^ ￿t) ￿ qtb ￿
1
a
























































































Assumption 1 The utility function takes the exponential (CARA) form:
u(c ￿ v(e)) = ￿
1
￿
expf￿￿(c ￿ v(e))g with ￿ > 0 and the function v is as in (36).
Proposition 2. If preferences are CARA, for each given ￿
t￿1; the present value of transfers solving problem (R￿ ) -











t=1 such that for all ￿

























































admits partial derivative with respect to ￿t and for each ￿xed past history
￿






































































38We will prove our proposition backwards. Let￿ s consider our problem in the last two periods. It is easy to see
from our relaxed problem that, since the agent has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility and the ￿rm maximizes the
expected discounted value of pro￿ts, the only link across states comes from the incentive constraints In the proof
below we will only consider the relevant incentive constraints.









max b;^ ￿T￿1￿￿T￿1u(^ ￿T￿1 + ￿(￿
T￿2;^ ￿T￿1) ￿ qT￿1b ￿
1
a




u(￿T + b + ￿(￿
T￿2;^ ￿T￿1;￿T))d￿(￿T j ￿
T￿1);
and
and for all ￿T￿1;￿T and ^ ￿T ￿ ￿T :
u(￿T + ￿(￿




(^ ￿T ￿ ￿T)); (40)
Lemma 2 If the utility function is CARA, the transfer scheme solving problem (R￿ ) satis￿es the following condition:
for all ￿






















exists and it equals (1
a ￿ 1) for all ￿
T￿1:
Proof. It is easy to see from (40) (by taking the inverse of u transformation to both sides and apply it to















T is a necessary condition for incentive




















T + "]: We claim that there is a modi￿cation to the contract that keeps
the same utility to the agent and reduces the net present value of the transfers for the ￿rm. The new scheme
is such that ~ ￿(￿
T￿1;￿
0
T) ￿ ~ ￿(￿
T￿1;￿
00





T) and for each node ￿
T￿1 the new transfer solves
R ￿+"




￿￿" u(￿T + ￿(￿
T￿1;￿T))d￿(￿T j ￿
T￿1). The fact that the new scheme
imposes less consumption dispersion to the agent implies that it is potentially able to deliver the same agent￿ s
expected utility with lower average transfers. We have to show that this change is incentive feasible. Let￿ s start




T +"] by construction.
Moreover, it reduces the utility at the top extreme of the range while it increases agent￿ s utility at the bottom of
the range. Now, from the speci￿c form of u we have
Z
￿

















u(￿T + b + ￿(￿
T￿1;￿T))d￿(￿T j ￿
T￿1)
for all b. The equality in the second row is true since the new scheme solves
R




￿ u(￿T + ￿(￿
T￿1;￿T))d￿(￿T j ￿
T￿1). This implies that the change does not a⁄ects (39) or any other incentive





; we can choose ￿
0
T > ￿T and obtain the
violation of the incentive compatibility constraint when the agent has shock ￿
0
T:







are unchanged for all t;b. Note that this result implies that the transfer
￿T is partially di⁄erentiable in ￿T with derivative equal to (1 ￿ 1
a) for all ￿
T￿1 and ￿T < ￿max:29 Note that when
￿max = 1 the function ￿T is partially di⁄erentiable everywhere. Q.E.D.
To complete the induction argument we need the following.
Lemma 3. If a transfer scheme solving (R￿ ) is such that for all s > t @
@￿sPV Ts(￿
s) = 1





a ￿ 1 for all ￿
t and all (￿t+1;:::￿T).
















t ): If this were not true then the agent with realization ￿
00
t would declare ￿
0
t and improve welfare.
In particular, let ￿ = PV Tt(￿
t￿1;￿
00
t ) ￿ PV Tt(￿
t￿1;￿
0










t: The agent would (have to) reduce e⁄ort so that the argument of the ￿ ow utility u in















t ) when telling the truth.
We now show that there is a plan of bonds ^ b such that telling the truth in the future and choosing the constructed
bonds plan improves agents￿ s welfare. Namely, we will show that constraint (37) is violated at node ￿
t: The bond
plan ^ b is constructed so that the deviating agent gets exactly the same argument in the ￿ ow utility u all nodes but


























the true history of shocks. Note

















= ￿t+s + ￿(￿
t+s) for










t+s￿1) ￿ ￿t+s(^ ￿
t+s￿1
):































It is east to see - by straightforward calculations - that the plan satis￿es two key properties. First, it delivers
the same consumption plan to the agent at all nodes but the last as claimed. This is so because our inductive




























t + "] and consider the modi￿cation to the contract that makes it an equality and delivers the same
expected utility to the agent over this range. We now show that this change is incentive compatible. The argument
is a generalization of the last part of the proof of Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Assumption 2. The stochastic process for skills follows: ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 = ￿ (L)vt; where ￿ (￿) is a polynomial of
order p in the lag operator L, and the innovation vt is white noise (serially uncorrelated) process assumed to be
29More precisely, for each ￿T < ￿max choose ￿
0
T > ￿T: We have just shown that for all ￿T such that ￿T ￿ ￿
0
T the






40normally distributed with zero mean and variance ￿2
v. The moving average process is invertible, that is the roots of
the polynomial ￿ (L) lie outside the unit circle (we normalize ￿0 = 1).30 Moreover, assume that qt = q for all t:
It should be clear from the proof, that next proposition - with the appropriate adjustments in notation - can
be shown with slightly more general processes for ￿t; as long as linearity in the law and the assumption of Gaussian
shocks are maintained. Moreover, the assumption of constant q is done only for notational simplicity. The obtained
expressions are those in the main text.














In particular, if the productivity process follows ￿t = ￿t￿1 + vt, we have c￿
t+1 ￿ c￿













avt+1 no matter what is the time horizon and the sequence of bond prices.

































































































t = ￿t +
1 ￿ q












30Obviously, we assume the following initial conditions for the process: ￿0 = v0 = v￿1 = ::v￿p = 0; where p is the
maximum number of lags in the MA component of the process.
31One would obtain the same for any process for bonds using the standard rearrangements in the permanent income







Second, if we apply Lemma 3 - in particular, see equation (38) - together with ￿t+n = y￿
t+n for all t;n; since
























If we now combine the two last expressions, we obtain:
c￿
t+1 ￿ c￿


























































v; we obtain the claimed
expression for consumption growth.
Clearly, the case with purely permanent shocks corresponds to the case where ￿i = 0 for i ￿ 1; hence the result
is trivial. It is also easy to show that in this case, b￿






￿ 1 for all t; and
@￿t (yt)
@yt￿s
= 0 for all t; s > 0:


















for all T < 1 and all fqtg
T￿1
t=1 : Q.E.D.
We now use that fact that the tax scheme is linear to show the following Lemma that concludes the proof.





t + ￿ (L)vt+1;


















1 + ￿1 + ::: + ￿p
￿
vt+1 for n ￿ p:
As long as T ￿ t ￿ 1 ￿ p; collecting terms ￿ vertically￿the expression takes the stable form we indicate in the main text.
42Proposition 4. If the agent has CARA preferences, when facing the above tax, the agent￿ s problem is concave,
so the derived tax scheme is optimal.
Proof. Note that so far we have shown that the transfer scheme is di⁄erentiable. Moreover, the agent￿ s
































a ￿ 1 the condition is met.










t: We can hence invert the identity map and
write the transfer scheme as a function of income histories yt: We have to show that, when facing the optimal tax












t=0 : Consider two contingent plans
















; and similarly for b￿
t and c￿
t : First of all, since assets enter linearly in the agent￿ s budget constraint
and e⁄ort enters linearly in the production function, the concavity of the agent￿ s utility in c￿v (e), and the additive
separability over time and states imply that if we show that c￿
t ￿ v (e￿

















we are done. If we set kt the constant of integration of ￿t; an agent who chooses plan e￿ of e⁄ort, at node ￿
t gets
c￿
t ￿ v (e￿







t￿i + kt ￿ v (e￿
t )












































































where the inequality in the penultimate row comes from the concavity of v in e: The last line uses the agent￿ s
budget constraint ct (yt) = yt + ￿ (yt): Q.E.D.
A ￿nal remark. Although the proof of the closed form uses ￿nite time, we conjecture that adapting the proof
of Proposition 7 in Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), we are able to show that same close form solution for T = 1
despite u is unbounded below.
7.2 Quadratic Utility
We now maintain the same assumptions on the cost function v (or the production function f) as in (36). Moreover,
we keep the linearity assumption for the process ￿t - ￿￿t = ￿ (L)vt - but we do not assume any parametric
distribution for the iid shocks vt (of course, we need to be able to take expectations). In fact, we now need to
assume that ￿ is bounded above by ￿max < 1; and that agent￿ s preferences are quadratic:
u(c ￿ v (e)) := ￿
1
2
￿ ￿ B ￿ (c ￿ v (e))
￿2
with ￿ B >> T￿max: (44)
43Finally, we are able to derive the closed form only within the class of transfer schemes that admit symmetric
cross partial derivative. Making assumptions on endogenous variables is of course not desirable, but note that
the incentive constraint will always impose some degree of monotonicity on the transfer scheme. Since monotone
function on compact sets are absolutely continuous, under few further regularity conditions, we conjecture that one
would be able to show at least almost everywhere di⁄erentiability of the transfer scheme. Of course, the symmetry
of the Hessian is an even stronger condition which we did not investigate how to show from primitives.
We have the following.
Proposition 5. If the agent has preferences as in (44) and ￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿ (L)vt; within the class of transfer
schemes that admit symmetric cross derivatives, taxes are linear in income histories: Moreover, if ￿ = q; the






Proof. First of all, from Lemma 1, in equilibrium we will get e￿
t ￿ 0; hence the transfer scheme is invertible
and we can write it in terms of income histories yt: We now need a crucial lemma, which uses di⁄erentiability.
Lemma 4. Within the class of within the class of transfer schemes that admit symmetric cross derivatives,




@ys does not depend on (yt;:::;yT) for all s: They are
hence linear functions of ys given yt:
Proof. Consider the following relaxed problem the ￿rm: Maximize expected discounted pro￿ts, choosing the
transfer scheme, subject to the ￿rst order conditions of the agent, namely for all t ￿ 1; and t ￿ s ￿ 0
1
b








u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n)









u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n)







and the Euler equations corresponding to u as in (44)































Since the ￿rm aims at insuring the agent, the relevant inequality is the second one. Moreover, given that there is
not gain in e¢ ciency in changing the implemented level of e⁄ort, and (46) is not a⁄ected as long as the average








@yT@yt = 0 for all t: Given our assumptions on the class of transfer schemes, by symmetry,
it must be that
@￿T(y
T)
@yt is constant in yT for all t < T.
44Now consider ￿T￿1. Since
@￿T(y
T)


































@yT￿1 is a constant for all all yT￿2 and yT￿1: Again, since











@ys is constant in
yt; :::; yT for all s: Q.E.D.








u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n)









u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n)







u0 (cT ￿ eT)









u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n)







u0 (cT ￿ eT)
u0 (cT￿1 ￿ eT￿1)
u0 (cT￿1 ￿ eT￿1)









u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n)







u0 (cT￿1 ￿ eT￿1)









u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n)














u0 (cT￿1 ￿ eT￿1)









u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n)














u0 (cT￿2 ￿ eT￿2)











where we repeatedly used the linearity of expectations and the Euler equation. We are hence done since - given
that the obtained taxes are linear - Proposition 4 implies that this transfer scheme is optimal (now within the class
of schemes we consider). Moreover, we are now able to follow the steps for the derivation of the closed form for
CARA utility and obtain a very similar closed form.










a ￿ 1; by using the
























The expressions for the optimal individual taxes ￿t can be obtained working backwards. In the working paper
Attanasio and Pavoni (2006) we consider generic q and ￿: When q 6= ￿ the expressions can get quite complicated even
for the purely temporary shocks. When ￿ = q however, from the Euler equation we have Etc￿
t+s = c￿
t for all s: So,
45following exactly the lines of proof of Proposition 3 above for CARA - namely using the standard re-arrangements




































7.3 Isoelastic Utility: A Closed Form in Logs
The outcome of this section will be an expression for innovation in log consumption of the form analogous to those















where vt+1 is the innovation to log of income and 1
￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption
at two consecutive dates, and ￿ > 0 is such that ￿q ￿ ￿ for ￿ ￿ 1.
7.3.1 Model and Derivation of the Permanent Income Equation
Assume a production function of the form:
lnyt = ln￿t + lnet;
and the following process for skills:
ln￿t = ln￿t￿1 + ￿ (L)vt:
As for the CARA case, an additional assumption, which will be crucial for us to get an exact closed form, is that
the shocks vt are normally distributed with zero mean and variance ￿2
v (note that we slightly abuse in notation
here).










expf(1 ￿ ￿)(lnct ￿ ￿(et)lnet)g;
where ￿(e) = 1
a for e ￿ 1 and ￿(e) = 1
b for e ￿ 1: Our aim is to write the problem in logs in order to exploit
the analogies to the case in levels. Clearly, the objective function of the agent is concave in log decisions whenever
￿ > 1; and assumption consistent with empirical ￿ndings.33 Since in equilibrium we have e￿
t ￿ 1; the Euler

























33For the UK, see Attanasio and Weber (1993).
46where we used the fact that in equilibrium ct+1 will be log-normally distributed,34 with ￿t and ￿2
t being the
conditional mean and conditional variance of ￿lnct+1 respectively.
Since we implement b￿
t ￿ 0, the budget constraint in equilibrium implies that lnc￿
t (yt) = lny￿
t + ln￿￿
t (yt): In
what follows, for notational simplicity, we will abuse in notation and use yt to denote the history of log incomes.
Since the logarithmic function is strictly monotone (and yt ￿ 0) every function of yt can be written as a

















Given our speci￿cation for v and u, the objective function can be all expressed in logs. It is now easy to see the
strong analogy to the case in levels considered above. In particular, we will follow the main line of proof we odopted
for the quadratic utility with the additional feature of log normality to obtain precise expressionf for (deterministic)
consumption growth rates as in the CARA case. If we assume that the transfer scheme ￿ is di⁄erentiable, the ￿rst















Once again if the transfer scheme admits symmetric cross derivative we can show backwards that the conditional
expectations can be decomposed since
@ ln￿t+n(y
t+n)
@ lnyt does not depend on (log) yt+n.
























Moreover, from the Euler equation (49) we obtain:
exp
￿















































> 0: In the log utility case, when ￿ = q then ￿t = 1:35 Similarly, by the law of












































which implies ￿t ￿
￿
q since ￿ ￿ 1: Moreover, when u is logarithmic,
we have ￿ = ￿
















































Again, using using the law of iterated expectations in the same way we did to derive equation (47), the incentive











Since in the log space, taxes are linear and the agent￿ s objective function is concave for ￿ ￿ 1; the so derived scheme
is the optimal one within the class of di⁄erentiable schemes with symmetric cross-derivative as it solves the relaxed
problem (only subject to the ￿rst order conditions), while being globally incentive compatible.
We can now follow the same steps as for the model in levels to obtain the desired permanent income expressions:


















































































It is hence again easy to see that for T ￿ t+1+p - using the properties of the ARIMA(p) process we postulated



























Since the polynomial is invertible, and 0 <q￿ ￿ ￿; all expressions are well de￿ned. Moreover, from (53) we obtain











v as claimed above.
7.3.2 Expressions for Taxes












































In order to get the derived expressions for log transfers hence the log of tax must display a deterministic drift. The
constant of integration ￿0 is chosen so that the planner￿ s budget constraint is satis￿ed.
Let consider now a more general process for ￿t: The expression for taxes can be computed backwards.
Since it takes an hugly expression for the periods close to T; we will derive its expression only when the
scxhme stabilizes, hence for t ￿ T ￿ p:
The whole analysis will be considerably simpli￿ed if we describe the transfer scheme in terms of the histories of
the shocks vt: In order to simplify the notation we keep all symbols as above (although this is an abuse in notation
of course). Let vt = (v1;:::; vt) be a given history of shocks. By repeatedly applying the law for ln￿t; we have




We will normalized ￿0 = 1, and that lagged terms in the MA expressions will be setted to zero as well by the other









this is so since, given vT￿1; the agent can lie over vT exactly in the same way as he would lie over ￿t; with
exactly the same marginal net costs/returns, as ￿0 = 1: As before, it is easy to show that taxes are linear in vt.
Note however that a lie over vt today a⁄ects future income not only through the transfer scheme, but also via
the persistence pattern of the process for ￿t; we hence have for t ￿ T ￿ p (note that we can eliminate the












1 + (q￿)(1 + ￿1) + (q￿)




































The incentive compatibility constraint (similar to Proposition 3 for the CARA case or the analysis for









(note that the functions ^ ￿ are not the same as the function ￿ in Proposition 3 but very similar in nature, namely
36Recall that we implement b￿
t ￿ 0 - i.e. c￿
t = y￿
t + ￿￿
t - and e￿
t ￿ 0:




@vt￿s ). Since ￿t+1 is normally distributed, taking the log operator in both sides











t + ln￿t +
p X
i=1




where we used the projection result: Et￿t+1 = ￿t +
Pp
i=1 ￿ivt+1￿i. We also used the linearity of the tax on





































































+ ￿1 + ￿2:














Hence, for s ￿ p; marginal taxes become constant. Now, in order for both the Euler equations and the














1 + q￿(1 ￿ ￿1) + (q￿)








1 + q￿(1 + ￿1) + (q￿)
2 (1 + ￿1 + ￿2) + :::
i
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1 + q￿(1 + ￿1) + (q￿)
2 (1 + ￿1 + ￿2) + :::
i
h
1 + q￿(1 ￿ ￿1) + (q￿)
2 (1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2) + :::
i;
50and of course all other taxes can be obtained from this expression from (61).
Finally, we derive the expression relating the chenge in the cross sectional variance of consumption
with the change in cross sectinal variance of income. Again, in order to have stable formulas we assume
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￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ :::￿p
￿
v1 + (t + 1)￿:



























Moreover, from the de￿nition of ￿t (55) we have that
￿var(lny￿
t) = [￿ (1)]
2
7.3.3 The Model with Purely Permanent and Purely Temporary Shocks
Assume agents have preferences over ct; lt and et : u(ct ￿ lt ￿ et): Moreover, assume that individual income can
be decomposed into two components: yt = xt + ￿t; where xt = f (￿
p





: In this model, xt








t i.i.d.; while ￿t represents the temporary
one, as vT







t + aT minflt;0g + bT maxflt;0g with aT > 1 > bT:
The analysis is now performed separately for the two type of shocks. Obviously, e￿
t = l￿
t = 0 at all nodes.
We can hence equivalently describe the transfer scheme in terms of incomes. In presence of both permanent and










the combined public history. In the CARA case, by following the same line of proof of Proposition









u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n ￿ lt+n)














u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n ￿ lt+n)









do not depend on histories before or after period t; we can uses the Euler equation and apply the law of iterated









u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n ￿ lt+n)












Of course, in the quadratic utility case, exactly the same expression for marginal taxes can be obtained assuming
the transfer scheme admits symmetric cross-derivatives in all elements of ht. If we write the expressions for a


















Assuming CARA (or quadratic) preferences, for permanent shocks, the Euler equation implies the same transfers












￿ 0; for all t,k;s > 0: (62)
It is easy to see by direct inspection of (62) and from the previous analysis that, as T ! 1; the expressions
for transfers become:
1 + ￿x =
1
ap and 1 + ￿￿ =
1 ￿ q
aT ;
52where 1 + ￿x = 1 +
@￿t(h
t)






@￿t for k > 0: Hence tax rates are time-invariant,
and the agent￿ s consumption reaction to income shocks is given by:37












where ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ = 0 when u is quadratic and ￿ = q:
As explained in the proof of Proposition 4, all the above expressions constitute optimal transfer schemes since
the agent￿ s problem is concave as all taxes are linear in all arguments.
8 Appendix C: Bias correction for the variance based test











gt = V ar(ygt)￿V ar(ygt); and "c
gt = V ar(cgt)￿V ar(cgt): The variance of the residuals " will go to zero as
the size of the cells in each time period increases. Moreover, information on the within cell variability can be used
to correct OLS estimates of the coe¢ cients in equation (63). In particular, a bias correct estimator will be given
by the following expression:
b ￿ = A￿1[e ￿ ￿ B] (64)












allows for the possibility
of correlation between the "
y
t and "c


















In computing the variance covariance matrix of this estimator it will be necessary to take into account the MA
structure of the residuals as well as the possibility that observations for di⁄erent groups observed at the same time
will be correlated.
37As it should be clear from the analysis for the Isoelastic model, the corresponding equation for the model in logs is












where recall that ￿
53 
 





















gross earnings gross earnings gross earnings + gross earnings + net earnings + net earnings +
 benefits  benefits benefits benefits
income equation
w2 11 11 1 1
ayc(t) - - - - - -
0.505 - 0.333 - 0.376 -
ayc(t-1) (20.735) - (25.683) - (18.240) -
-0.672 - -0.748 - -0.507 -
ayc(t-2) (12.252) - (18.183) - (10.247) -
w1
ayy(t) 1.159 1.171 1.073 1.064 0.771 0.793
(0.346) (0.317) (0.329) (0.317) (0.253) (0.243)
ayy(t-1) -1.140 -1.148 -0.887 -0.894 -0.602 -0.587
(0.454) (0.415) (0.492) (0.459) (0.342) (0.323)
ayy(t-2) 0.992 0.995 0.827 0.844 0.619 0.568
(0.370) (0.331) (0.356) (0.311) (0.257) (0.227)
consumption equation
w1
acc(t) 1 1 1 1 1 1
-- -- - -
acc(t-1) -0.577 -0.493 -0.604 -0.491 -0.612 -0.499
(0.196) (0.114) (0.193) (0.116) (0.191) (0.111)
acc(t-2) 0.084 - 0.116 - 0.118 -
(0.201) - (0.191) - (0.193) -
Log L -773.3 -773.9 -759.5 -760.6 -685.0 -685.5
excess smoothness -0.491 -0.499 -0.489 -0.493 -0.273 -0.263
se (0.171) (0.165) (0.160) (0.153) (0.132) (0.128)
Comparison with 4 lags model
Log L 4lags model -771.5 -773.6 -756.3 -760.4 -681.7 -685.3
LR 3.7 0.54 6.34 0.42 6.52 0.34
P-value 0.717 0.763 0.386 0.811 0.368 0.844
NOTES: 
- all data are in (first diff of) levels
- SE in parentheses
- excess smoothness test computed as sum(acc(t-L))-sum(ayy(t-L))=0, with L=0,…,4
- interest rate =0.01
- Income/consumption shock is the shock that enters both the income and the consumption equation
- LR test is the test of current model against previous (to the left) one. In green if restrictions Table 2
Total Consumption Expenditure
gross earnings gross earnings gross earnings + gross earnings + net earnings + net earnings +
benefits benefits benefits benefits
income equation
w2 11 1 1 1 1
ayc(t) - - - - - -
51.615 - 0.400 - 0.321 -
ayc(t-1) (1535.290) - (9.124) - (28.027) -
-36.884 - -0.968 - -0.765 -
ayc(t-2) (1072.450) - (7.222) - (20.287) -
w1
ayy(t) 0.596 0.586 0.730 0.497 0.683 0.662
(0.427) (0.351) (0.383) (0.346) (0.236) (0.205)
ayy(t-1) -0.341 -0.673 -0.472 -0.533 -0.277 -0.273
(0.638) (0.473) (0.572) (0.477) (0.358) (0.304)
ayy(t-2) 0.572 0.981 0.561 0.910 0.330 0.363
(0.451) (0.467) (0.430) (0.451) (0.280) (0.238)
consumption equation
w1
acc(t) 1 1 1 1 1 1
-- - - - -
acc(t-1) -0.349 -0.346 -0.386 -0.345 -0.372 -0.395
(0.406) (0.208) (0.366) (0.202) (0.367) (0.172)
acc(t-2) -0.069 - -0.022 - -0.031 -
(0.358) - (0.330) - (0.319) -
Log L -885.2 -886.0 -869.4 -870.5 -788.0 -788.9
excess smoothness -0.233 -0.224 -0.217 -0.203 -0.131 -0.174
se (0.128) (0.144) (0.116) (0.113) (0.099) (0.128)
Comparison with 4 lags model
Log L 4lags model -882.3 -885.4 -867.8 -869.6 -786.2 -788.3
LR 5.78 1.24 3.26 1.82 3.54 1.1
P-value 0.448 0.538 0.776 0.403 0.739 0.577
NOTES: 
all data are in (first diff of) levels
SE in parentheses
excess smoothness test computed as sum(axx(t-L))-sum(ayx(t-L))=0, with L=0,…,4
interest rate =0.01Table 3
Total Consumption Expenditure: log specification
gross earnings gross earnings gross earnings + gross earnings + net earnings + net earnings +





ayy(t-1) 0.332 - 0.181 - 0.159 -
(14.452) - (4.936) - (1.982) -
ayy(t-2) -0.748 - -0.779 - -0.595 -
(10.305) - (3.957) - (1.426) -
Income/Consumption Shock
ayx(t) 0.889 0.816 0.717 0.748 0.799 0.570
(0.200) (0.155) (0.162) (0.146) (0.191) (0.187)
ayx(t-1) -1.102 -1.250 -0.685 -0.836 -0.523 -0.222
(0.249) (0.206) (0.216) (0.177) (0.253) (0.211)
ayx(t-2) 0.393 0.660 0.094 0.223 -0.120 0.086





axx(t-1) -0.601 -1.011 -0.647 -1.011 -0.578 -0.619
(0.243) (0.008) (0.279) (0.008) (0.324) (0.125)
axx(t-2) -0.411 - -0.368 - -0.444 -
(0.247) - (0.282) - (0.330) -
Log L 100.9 97.2 153.3 148.6 173.8 168.2
LR 7.4 9.38 11.16
P-Value 0.007 0.002 0.001
excess smoothness -0.181 -0.226 -0.133 -0.141 -0.170 -0.048
se (0.100) (0.079) (0.050) (0.053) (0.066) (0.106)
NOTES: 
all data are in (first diff of) levels
SE in parentheses
excess smoothness test computed as sum(axx(t-L))-sum(ayx(t-L))=0, with L=0,…,4
interest rate =0.01Table 4
Variance Based Test
non durable consumption non durable consumption total consunmption total consumption 
 per ad.eq.   per ad.eq. 
Ind. Var.
Gross earnings  0.0709 0.0376 0.0765 0.0547
0.0133 0.0154 0.0177 0.0196
implied a 3.7556 5.1571 3.6144 4.2746
0.0484 0.0900 0.0610 0.0865
Gross earnings+ 0.2357 0.1476 0.3019 0.2495
benefits 0.0302 0.0355 0.0401 0.0448
implied a 2.0596 2.6032 1.8200 2.0021
0.0447 0.0747 0.0492 0.0634
Net earnings + 0.2601 0.1466 0.3478 0.2733
benefits 0.0351 0.0413 0.0463 0.0519
implied a 1.9608 2.6121 1.6957 1.9129
0.0482 0.0871 0.0511 0.0686
Number of observ 505 505 505 505